

Europe's Changing Economic Structure

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The ANNALIST

A Journal of Finance, Commerce and Economics

PUBLISHED WEEKLY BY THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY

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Vol. 56, No. 1437

New York, Thursday, August 1, 1940

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THE BUSINESS OUTLOOK

The current rise in the business index is largely due to increased electric power consumption as a result of the hot weather. Commodity prices have declined further. New manufacturers' orders are rising sharply, but business activity in general continues to mark time. Further reports on June foreign trade show exports of manufacturers to have been the greatest since 1921, except for March and April 1929. The stock market finally came out of its lethargy.

CHIEFLY because of further expansion of electric power consumption, the preliminary business index for the week ended July 27 rose further to an estimated 101.4 from 101.1 the week before and 100.4 two weeks previous. As noted last week, the rise in power usage reflected the extremely hot weather of the second half of July, resulting in much increased loads on refrigerating and air conditioning equipment.

The electric power index itself rose to 105.8 from 103.2, and is now the highest since 1937. It is noteworthy that in New England—the main region to escape the extreme heat—the increase in power consumption over a year ago amounted to only 2.7 per cent, the least for any region, comparing with 11.1 per cent for the country as a whole.

The week's increase in the general business index is therefore to be regarded, owing to the temporary basis of the rise in the power index, as of only moderate significance. The following customary table of the probable readings of the Federal Reserve Board's industrial production index, on the basis of its usual correlation with The New York Times weekly business index, is offered for the record:

June 22	118	July 13	115
June 29	118	July 20	116
July 6	115	July 27	116

Of the other components of the index, freight-car loadings, cotton consumption and automobile production declined further. Cotton textile output, despite the receding trend of the past three weeks, is still at excellent levels, but the unsatisfactory volume of current sales suggests further contraction. The downward trend of automobile output since its peak in early June of course reflects the changing over to 1941 models; the decline is likely to extend another two weeks. Meanwhile,

trade reports suggest somewhat larger third and fourth quarter production schedules than had been anticipated earlier. Chevrolet retail new-car sales for the second ten days of July showed a gain over a year ago of 36 per cent, as against 32 per cent for the first ten days.

AVERAGE DAILY CHEVROLET NEW-CAR SALES BY TEN-DAY PERIODS

	1940.	1939.	P. C.
First	3,367	2,586	30
Second	3,339	2,873	16
Third	3,972	3,500	13
June:			
First	3,480	2,628	32
Second	3,815	2,807	36
Third	5,054	3,273	54
July:			
First	3,484	2,643	32
Second	3,294	2,422	36

Steel operations continue to expand, the estimated rate of operations for the week ended Aug. 3 being the highest since last December. Reports of a leveling off of consumer demand have so far not been reflected in any material downward trend of orders.

It is now possible to consider somewhat more objectively the effects upon the United States of a possible Nazi victory than could be done during the tragic days of the French collapse in June. At that time the sudden realization that if Britain too succumbed this country would find itself alone in an unfriendly world, unprepared economically, militarily or politically, came as a severe moral shock. Now, however, it is becoming increasingly important to begin to appraise, so far as possible, America's position in the world that is likely to emerge.

The present writer shares the views of those who maintain that the United States must prepare itself, as far as lies within its powers, for the worst—meaning by the worst, a complete Nazi victory in Europe; a Nazi regime heady from its triumphs,

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Week ended	Freight Misc.	Car Loadings Other	Steel Total	Electric Mill Power Prod.	Auto Prod.	Lumber Prod.	Cotton Mill Activity	Comb. Index	Cyclical Price
1939.									
July 22.....	74.0	88.8	78.4	83.9	97.7	56.8	81.4	132.1	90.6
July 29.....	75.2	88.8	79.2	89.4	99.0	50.4	78.2	128.1	91.5
Aug. 5.....	74.9	89.6	79.3	89.1	99.2	38.8	78.0	124.9	91.1
1940.									
June 29.....	86.0	98.6	89.7	135.2	103.2	94.4	80.7	138.8	102.9
July 6.....	82.5	103.2	88.6	136.1	99.1	98.8	64.6	150.0	71.0
July 13.....	80.3	103.8	87.3	133.2	101.0	101.4	74.6	142.0	100.4
July 20.....	80.4	101.5*	86.7	130.7	103.2	77.7	80.9	137.9	101.1
July 27.....	85.4	130.9	106.8	106.8	65.6	...	131.7	*101.4	88.5
Aug. 3.....	...	134.5	89.0

*Estimated. †Revised. ‡Computed as of Wednesday.

turning toward the Western Hemisphere for new worlds to conquer, not too exhausted by the current struggle, perhaps carrying its threat through a Japanese alliance into two oceans—all this before the United States should have had time to fortify itself. Beyond doubt, the more quickly and energetically the United States strengthens itself, the less likely it will be confronted with the "worst."

If such possibilities need to be faced, however, it does not necessarily follow that they are *foregone* even in the event that Britain falls. The probabilities of the new world, as contrasted with the *possibilities*, call for more consideration than they seem to have received. An intelligent balance between complacency and hysteria, unusually hard to maintain today, is more than usually needed.

First of all, it must be recognized that even if Germany does not win there can be no returning to the world of 1939 (nor for that matter to the world of 1929 or of 1914). Even if it be assumed that Nazi power is destroyed and a basis for lasting peace is discovered such as would restore the confidence so terribly shaken in the past few years, nevertheless the outright losses and—even more serious—the disclosures caused by the war to date make it inevitable that all Europe will have to retain stringent restrictions, both on its foreign trade and on its internal economies, for an indefinite period.

Indeed, if the Nazi power were to break down, Europe would not be likely to escape widespread economic and moral collapse or even political chaos, as suggested in Mr. Deller's letter in this issue of *THE ANNALIST*. Such a Europe would almost certainly lack credit for borrowing, as in 1919 and 1920, for purposes of reconstruction. In the absence of generous help from the United States—very likely even with it—the only gainer might well prove to be Russian communism. In any event, recovery from the disorganization on the Continent would be made much more difficult and slow by the social ferment and unrest that even before the present war in many countries had corroded the very bases of society and of government itself.

Furthermore, the place of Europe in the world's economy has been undergoing changes no less fundamental for their

slow and long-term character—changes that are leading to maladjustments which the present war can only aggravate. Some of these trends are discussed in Mr. Drucker's provocative article in this week's issue of *THE ANNALIST*. Two other world tendencies may be noted.

The modern emphasis on *autarkie*—economic self-sufficiency—in both agricultural and industrialized nations, is only in part due to the fear of war. It is at least as much the result of purely economic considerations of peacetime—the vulnerability of the modern State to economic forces and economic policies emanating from other countries. This at bottom is due to the fact that the area of the State's vital economic interests and activities is not as a rule identical with that in which it exercises political rule. If the two areas can be made identical, all the factors affecting the nation's economic life can obviously be brought within the nation's own control. The *autarkists* seek to make the two areas—the political and the economic—identical by shrinking the latter; the Nazi imperialists would solve the dilemma by expanding the former (the two groups are of course not mutually exclusive). For all the valid criticisms that may be directed against *autarkie* as a policy, it is likely to retain its appeal until such time as some international organization of society along either Nazi or League of Nations lines is able to assure stability in the economic relations of the various national units.

Another tendency is the revolt against what some term the economic anarchy of the modern liberal capitalist State. The classical school of economics, which still largely dominates the economic thought of the English-speaking democracies, assumed relatively small economic units, which were kept in their proper places by active competition. In the modern democratic State, economic units of all sorts—industrial, labor, agricultural—have, by virtue of expanding size and growing integration, been able to bring increasing pressure to bear on the government for the furthering of their own interests. The Nazi-Fascist State, with its doctrine of the supremacy of the State over all groups within it, represents (among many other things!) a revolt against government by special interests. Whether it offers any

real solution to the problem is another matter, but until democracy itself can find an answer that will carry conviction to the nations' population, it will continue to be confronted with the disillusionment over democratic methods that is so characteristic today.

If one assume the other alternative of German victory, with the conquest of England and a Nazi-dominated Europe, it may fairly be asked whether Germany will actually be able to organize Europe effectively. Her ability to do this has generally been taken for granted, yet it is not necessarily foregone. It may be assumed that there would be no difficulty in maintaining purely military rule. It may probably also be assumed that the economic reorganization of Europe along Nazi lines, simply as a technical problem, would not be beyond Nazi capacity.

It is not to be assumed out of hand, however, that the creation of a unified Nazi-Europe economy would merely be a technical problem. Such an economic reorganization would be no more than a single aspect of the attempted Nazification of the entire social and political life of the vassal States. Whether the iron fist would be able to offset by its vigor and severity the antagonisms its use would surely arouse in peoples with as long a national history as the Dutch, French or British, only time can show. It is not unlikely that weakness in the political and social structure of the New Europe would for a long time prevent the utilization of anything like the full economic

strength of the Continent, and might even limit it seriously. On the other hand, there is little doubt, even so, that Nazi power would be very much augmented.

As to Nazi policy toward the United States and the Western Hemisphere, the possibility of an aggressive military program is not wholly to be dismissed. It may be that, as "Hans Schmidt" wrote recently in *THE ANNALIST*,¹ Hitler must ever "move on like the man on the bicycle," to new conquests. On the other hand, the Nazi regime would certainly find much of its efforts absorbed for some time in organizing its European gains. How far, under such circumstances, it would be able to drive its own people, exhausted by seven years and more of deprivations, to make new sacrifices for problematical military conquests in the Western Hemisphere, seems to this writer to be by no means certain—assuming that the United States itself really knows what it intends to stand for in the Western Hemisphere and tolerates no delay in its defense program.

Even assuming no overt military moves against the Western Hemisphere, however, it is scarcely to be expected that Nazi post-war policy toward the United States would be friendly or toward the Western Hemisphere other than aggressive. The writer plans next week to discuss some of the elements in that policy and what they would involve for this country.

WINTHROP W. CASE.

June 20, 1940, page 853.

Vol. 56
No. 1437

The ANNALIST

August 1
1940
Reg. U. S. Pat. Off.

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
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THE ANNALIST—Published Weekly by The New York Times Company, Times Square, New York City. Telephone Lackawanna 4-1000. Subscriptions may be placed at any Branch Office of The New York Times. In United States, 1 Year, \$7.00; Canada (postpaid), 1 Year, \$8.50; Mexico, South and Central America (postpaid), 1 Year, \$7.50. Other countries (postpaid), \$9.00. Entered as second-class matter March 21, 1914, at the Postoffice of New York, N. Y., under Act of March 3, 1879.

AUG

Telephone Earnings Approach 1929-31 Peak; Cable Revenues Boosted by War



By WINTHROP W. CASE

OPERATING revenues of telephone companies are currently running at new record heights. For the first four months of 1940 they amounted to \$422,000,000 or 6.4 per cent above the same period a year ago, when they aggregated \$387,000,000 (Table I). Net operating income is making even larger percentage gains, owing to the relative stability of costs.

Operating revenues for the entire year 1939 amounted to \$1,222,000,000. Not only did this exceed the previous post-depression high of \$1,162,000,000 in 1938 but it seems to have surpassed even the previous all-time high of \$1,186,000,000 (computed on a slightly different basis) in 1930. At the present rate of increase over 1939 the 1940 total is likely to be still larger; on the basis of the showing for the first four months of the year operating revenues for 1940 may reach as high as \$1,300,000,000. The Bell System consolidated figures indicate no let-up of the improvement through May.

TABLE I. TELEPHONE COMPANY OPERATING REVENUES
(Millions of dollars; all companies with annual operating revenues in excess of \$250,000)

	Operating Revenues		Net Operating Income	
	P. C. Tolls	P. C. of change	Total Op. Rev.	P. C. of change
Local Ex- Message to Total	Tolls Local All.			
1916... \$200 \$70 35.0 \$223 \$79 27.3				
1917... 222 82 36.9 318 76 23.9				
1918... 237 91 35.8 345 72 27.9				
1919... 277 113 40.8 410 77 18.8				
1920... 305 135 41.2 469 82 16.8				
1921... 373 139 37.3 541 107 19.8				
1922... 405 154 38.0 591 126 21.3				
1923... 443 169 38.1 648 137 21.1				
1924... 486 179 36.8 705 151 21.4				
1925... 541 207 38.3 794 187 23.6				
1926... 593 225 39.6 881 212 24.1				
1927... 636 256 40.3 952 227 23.8				
1928... 680 291 42.8 1,042 253 24.3				
1929... 732 332 45.4 1,147 278 24.2				
1930... 770 323 41.9 1,186 271 22.8				
1931... 764 301 39.1 1,158 273 23.6				
1932... 709 239 33.7 1,034 211 20.4				
1933... 647 225 34.8 952 184 19.3				
1934... 619 236 38.1 940 185 19.7				
1935... 654 251 38.4 993 194 19.5				
1936... 700 287 41.0 1,096 239 21.8				
NEW BASIS				
1933... 224 ... 949 183 19.3				
1934... 240 ... 961 191 19.9				
1935... 256 ... 1,015 201 19.8				
1936... 289 ... 1,096 239 21.8				
1937... 751 304 40.5 1,158 227 19.6				
1938... 763 295 38.7 1,162 210 18.1				
1939... 798 319 40.0 1,222 239 19.6				
January-April:				
1939... 263 99 37.8 397 77 19.4				
1940... 279 108 38.8 422 85 20.0				
P. C.				
Change +6.1 +8.9 ... +6.4 +9.9 ...				

*Prior to 1932 operating income.

A new record was also established by the number of telephones in service at the end of April, which stood at 18,992,000, against 17,974,000 a year previous; 17,336,000 on April 30, 1938; 16,497,000 on April 30, 1937, and a pre-depression high of 17,250,000 on May 31, 1931. The rate of increase, moreover, has acceler-

ated, 1,018,000 new telephones being placed in use in the year ended April 30, 1940, against only 638,000 for the preceding twelve-month period and 839,000 in the year before.

Earnings have also improved, although less spectacularly, owing to the higher operating costs and tariff reductions over the past few years. Net operating income for 1939 was reported at \$239,000,000, against \$210,000,000 for 1938. Although it just equaled the 1936 income—the highest since the depression—it fell considerably short of the 1929-31 earnings. (Table I.) On the basis of the 1940 rate of increase through April, net operating income in the present year may reach as high as \$260,000,000, which would leave it not very far below the 1929-31 record figures.

TABLE II. TELEGRAPH, CABLE AND RADIOTELEGRAPH COMPANY OPERATING REVENUES (Millions of dollars)

	Telegraph and Cable Companies		Net Operating Income
	Comm. Tolls	All. to Total	
1917... \$71 \$92 77.2 20.5 22.3			
1918... 75 102 73.5 15.4 15.1			
1919... 91 121 75.2 19.6 16.1			
1920... 108 140 77.1 17.6 12.6			
1921... 97 124 78.2 15.2 12.3			
1922... 101 127 79.5 20.4 16.1			
1923... 108 134 80.6 19.1 14.3			
1924... 109 136 80.1 18.6 13.7			
1925... 123 152 80.9 21.5 14.1			
1926... 130 160 81.2 20.8 13.0			
1927... 128 158 81.0 21.5 13.6			
1928... 131 164 79.9 21.4 13.0			
1929... 137 175 78.3 21.5 12.3			
1930... 123 158 77.8 14.7 9.3			
1931... 104 135 77.0 11.2 8.3			
1932... 79 104 76.0 5.4 5.2			
1933... 79 103 75.7 9.8 9.5			
1934... 83 108 76.9 9.1 8.4			
1935... 87 112 77.7 13.0 11.6			
1936... 95 121 77.9 14.9 12.2			
1937... 96 124 76.7 8.5 8.0			
Telegraph, Cable and Radiotelegraph Companies			
Operating Revenues			
1934... 108 10.7 7.9 127 11.3 1.0			
1935... 112 10.1 8.4 131 14.5 4.0			
1936... 122 10.5 9.4 142 17.4 7.1			
1937... 124 11.2 10.7 146 11.9 2.5			
1938... 113 10.0 9.7 133 4.4 d 5.3			
1939... 117 11.0 12.2 140 9.8 d 8.0			
January-April:			
1939... 36.4 3.3 3.5 43.1 ...			
1940... 38.2 3.8 4.3 45.7 ...			
P. C.			
Change +4.9 +15.6 +24.3 +6.0			

d Deficit. *Western Union Company, both telephone and cable operations; Postal Telegraph-Cable Company, primarily telephone operations; altogether covering in 1935 about 92 per cent of total for all telephone and cable companies. †Three telegraph, five cable and ten radiotelegraph carriers with annual operating revenues of \$50,000 or more. Includes revenues from Western Union cable operations.

Operating revenues of telephone, cable and radiotelegraph companies for the first four months of 1940 also show pronounced improvement, although the gain in the two latter categories was much the

largest, owing of course to the increased international traffic resulting from the war. (Table II.) Revenues of ten radiotelegraph companies in 1939 were the largest in the six years for which the figures are available—again reflecting the wartime stimulation of traffic. Those of five cable companies were the largest except for 1937, while those of the telephone companies, although greater than in 1938, were well below the 1936 and 1937 figures.

Taking this sector of the communications industry, earnings as a whole have remained unsatisfactory, a loss of \$800,000, but compares less favorably with the count in 1939. This, it is true, is an improvement over the 1938 deficit of \$5,300,000, but compares less favorably with the profits of preceding years. The loss, however, was entirely due to the telephone companies, both the cable and radio-telegraph concerns showing a clear net income for 1939, as in the three previous ones.

The earnings prospects for the telephone companies for 1940 are not clear. The rise of 4.9 per cent in their operating revenues for the first four months of the year points toward an even greater improvement in earnings, but whether, if it is continued, it will suffice to eliminate the deficit cannot yet be foreseen.

The 1940 earnings of the cable and radiotelegraph companies will depend to a considerable extent on the course of the war, any forecast as to which is obviously premature. If the rate of gain that has marked the first three months of this year should be maintained, revenues of both types of companies should exceed previous available figures by a large margin, and earnings should benefit comparably. If British resistance to Germany should collapse, however, it would presumably entail the loss of at least a considerable part of the recent revenue gains.

The War and the Telephone Industry

The war does not appear likely to have extensive repercussions upon the telephone industry, unless it should prove long or the United States should be involved. The volume of traffic would probably not be greatly affected in any case, especially since 60 per cent of the telephones represent residential installations, which are relatively stable and are only materially curtailed in the event of such severe depressions as that of the early Nineteen Thirties.

If the war should be long, it is possible that prices would rise to the point where wage increases could not be refused. Inasmuch as wages absorb nearly one-half of gross revenues, such increases, if extensive, could adversely affect earnings. Offsetting rate increases would involve the obtaining of approval by the various State regulatory commissions, a procedure which would be slow and relatively difficult, despite the absence in the industry of such a political rate issue as has marked the power industry. This contingency, however, may be regarded as present as fairly remote.

Should the United States enter the war, the telephone industry would doubtless be placed under government control. This presumably would entail the guarantee of dividends and interest for the duration of hostilities, a perceptible advantage in view of the likelihood, under such conditions, of rising costs.

Depreciation allowances continue to supply an element of uncertainty in the longer outlook. The ultra-conservative policy followed by the industry in the past has resulted in the building up of very large depreciation reserves. The high rate employed and the consequent large reserves have been criticized by various gov-

ernmental bodies, up to and including the United States Supreme Court. It is probable that, in the long run, the industry will have to reduce these charges and the reserves if it wishes to avoid having rates fixed on valuations from which the accumulated reserves will first have been deducted.

Request was made of Congress some time ago by the Federal Communications Commission that increased authority be granted the commission for the supervision of the industry. So far no action has been taken, however, and it is likely that at least so long as the international emergency continues Congress will make no move in this direction.

Telegraph Industry Trends

The telegraph industry, as is well known, is suffering from a long-run downward trend of traffic, owing principally to the aggressive development of telephone competition, and more recently of the air mail. As will be seen from the chart, expansion has for a long time been at a slower rate than that of the telephone industry. Today, largely dependent upon business activity for its traffic, it is highly susceptible to business depression, with the further disadvantage of a lack of recuperative power after the passing of such economic setbacks. It is quite likely that the peak volume of traffic reached in 1929 may never again be equalled.

Costs are not flexible. Wages absorb an even larger proportion of revenues than in the telephone industry, while the relatively strong organization of telegraph labor makes wage reductions more difficult in times of depression and impedes the installation of labor-saving machinery. A sharp increase in traffic, however, could have considerable effects upon net earnings as a result of this very inflexibility of costs, even though under such circumstances the issue of increased wages might have to be faced. An increase in traffic as a result of the war, however, is only likely to come as a result of increased general business activity.

TABLE III. EFFECTS OF THE WAR ON CABLE AND RADIOTELEGRAPH-COMPANY OPERATING REVENUES

	Carriers		Carriers
	1939-1938, P. C.	1940-1939, Change	1940-1938, P. C.
Jan. ... 856 862 + 0.7 864 800 + 8.0			
Feb. ... 756 765 - 1.2 795 779 + 2.1			
Mar. ... 901 855 + 5.4 960 911 + 5.4			
Apr. ... 768 749 + 2.5 861 810 + 6.3			
May ... 790 793 - 0.4 880 749 + 17.5			
June ... 774 803 - 3.6 834 785 + 6.2			
July ... 707 809 - 12.6 780 760 + 2.6			
Aug. ... 802 791 + 1.4 893 777 + 14.9			
Sept. ... 1,417 889 + 69.4 1,622 809 + 100.5			
Oct. ... 1,062 861 + 26.8 1,263 804 + 57.1			
Nov. ... 989 830 + 19.2 1,152 807 + 42.8			
Dec. ... 1,103 976 + 13.0 1,258 879 + 43.1			
Jan. ... 994 856 + 16.1 1,109 864 + 28.4			
Feb. ... 926 756 + 22.5 1,028 795 + 29.3			
Mar. ... 936 901 + 3.9 1,072 960 + 11.7			
April ... 973 798 + 21.9 1,116 961 + 29.6			

Merger of Western Union and Postal has long been under discussion. It would require modification of existing anti-trust legislation, which has been impeded, among other reasons, by telegraph labor, disturbed over the possibility of displacement as a result of consolidation of telegraph facilities. If no such curtailment of labor costs were permitted, the benefits of a merger would be much reduced. The FCC has recommended consolidation, but has not yet submitted detailed planes in the matter.

Cable and Radiotelegraph

The gains achieved as a result of the war so far are much more pronounced in the cable and radiotelegraph industries, which of course are dependent primarily on the volume of international communication. This is apparent in Table II, from which it may be seen that the gain for the first four months of 1940 over a year ago amounted to 24.3 per cent in the case of

the radiotelegraph companies, and 15.6 per cent for the cable carriers, as against only 4.9 for the telegraph concerns (the latter percentage also includes revenues derived by the Western Union from cable operation).

The effects of the war are even more

clearly brought out in Table III, in which monthly revenues for the cable and the radiotelegraph companies are compared for the war and pre-war periods. The sharp jump in the percentage of gain over a year previous, recorded in September last year, has not been entirely sustained, but

only a moderate portion has since been lost. International Telephone and Telegraph is in a special position, as regards the war, owing to its extensive facilities in foreign countries. Some 56 per cent of its consolidated assets, etc., are reported as in the western hemisphere. Its holdings in

Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands and France are reported as undamaged, but the transfer of funds is of course impossible under present conditions, while the future status of the properties themselves is naturally highly problematical.

The Volume of Unreported Trading in New York Stock Exchange Stocks

By DONALD MYRICK

his full order was not executed. The simple expedient of not showing the stopped sale on the tape may avoid a considerable amount of explaining, but unfortunately it also results in the omission of a significant volume of sales from the daily reports.

As to odd-lot transactions, a portion is, of course, reflected in round-lot transactions of the odd-lot brokers. However, by far the greater proportion of odd-lot purchase orders is matched by selling orders for the same stocks. This matching process is further increased by internal clearings through inventories which odd-lot brokers carry of the more active stocks. Such inventories are allowed to vary in size within certain limits, so that even a number of unmatched orders do not immediately create transactions reported on the tape. By these methods the volume of odd-lot transactions producing round-lot business on the floor of the Exchange is reduced to about 20 per cent of the total, and 80 per cent of odd-lot transactions are not shown on the tape in any manner.

If the SEC figures are adjusted to eliminate odd-lot duplications, a revised total of 316,000,000 shares is reached, still 21 per cent larger than floor volume alone. Furthermore, the differential between the two sets of figures exhibits substantial variations when studied on a day-to-day basis. An analysis of the chief factors entering into these differences reveals their nature.

Stopped Sales

Consider first the volume of stopped sales. In 1939 total sales falling into this classification amounted to 24,000,000 shares, or 9 per cent of total floor trading. The figure includes a number of minor adjustments which swell the results to a small extent, but stopped sales account for most of the aggregate. It was determined by deducting the annual total of floor volume from the preliminary SEC total of round-lot sales on the New York Stock Exchange last year, and may be changed slightly when final data are available.

As stopped sales are often confused with stop-loss sales, it may be well to define them more fully. Stopped sales are those transactions which arise when options issued by specialists are exercised. When a spread exists between the bid and asked prices on a particular stock, such options are frequently given. For example, with the market 57 bid for 200 shares, 60 asked, a broker may receive an order to sell 100 shares at the market. In order to protect his client, he may ask the specialist to stop his 100 shares at the 57 bid price while he endeavors to secure a better bid. If a selling order now comes in to dispose of 200 shares at 57, the broker who has stopped the stock at this price takes the 100 shares stopped, plus 100 shares of the later offer. In order to avoid confusion, however, he permits printing on the tape of only the 100-share sale, a privilege granted either party to such transactions under Stock Exchange rules. Otherwise, the customer who offered 200 shares at 57 might wonder why

Because both buy and sell orders in odd-lots are subject to taxation, the SEC includes both classes in its figures of volume of trading, although, of course, on round-lot transactions a buy and a sale order are counted but once. To arrive at a truer picture of market activity, one-half of the total of odd-lot sales and purchases affords a more dependable figure. Even this result must be adjusted for the round-lot volume generated by the odd-lot brokers and already included in the total of round-lot transactions. Since such dealers' orders obviously do not offset each other to any great extent, the sum of both their purchases and sales must be taken into account. If this total is first subtracted from the gross total of odd-lot purchases and sales and the resultant figure is divided in two, the result indicates as closely as possible the volume produced by odd-lot orders, not included in present reports of floor volume.

The most accurate figure of the volume of trading is therefore reached by adding this net adjusted volume of odd-lot trading to the SEC data of round-lot trans-

actions, which already include stopped sales not reported in the volume of floor trading. As mentioned, in 1939 this results in a new total of 54,000,000 shares, or 21 per cent above the floor volume total. With stopped sales constituting 9 per cent of the 21 per cent, odd-lot business was responsible for the remaining 12 per cent.

A study of the daily fluctuations between the SEC adjusted figures and the customary reports indicates rather wide fluctuations around the 21 per cent average differential. Taking September, 1939, a month of large daily volume, and December, 1939, a month of light trading, the more accurate figures range from 17 to 28 per cent greater than the reported floor volumes. (See table.)

By way of extenuation of the omission of stopped sales and odd-lot sales, it is pointed out that neither are price-establishing transactions. In other words, both types of trading are based on the price of a transaction which is reported on the tape and in the volume of floor trading. For some purposes this may be a satisfactory reason for omitting them, but where the study is of the volume of stock moving at certain price levels, all transactions must necessarily be included.

Out-of-Town Sales

To have a fully comprehensive picture of volume at given prices, all sales, wherever made, are theoretically required. This would include transactions in New York stocks on other exchanges and all over-the-counter transactions in such listed shares. Volume of sales on exchanges outside of New York City amounted to only forty-seven million shares in 1939, mostly of local securities. Even should there be included a fairly sizable percentage of New York stocks, the totals involved would be of far less importance than the odd-lot and stopped sales indicated.

No data are available covering over-the-counter transactions, although substantial blocks of stock are reported moving in this manner from time to time. With the prospective SEC organization of the over-the-counter market, sales data from this source may later be compiled.

It must be apparent from the foregoing that any attempt to study trading volumes of individual stocks is confronted by overwhelming obstacles under present circumstances. The data now available give no allocation to specific issues of odd-lot and stopped sales—sales which, it has been shown, increase reported volumes by between 17 per cent and 28 per cent. With the ratio of unreported sales for the market as a whole fluctuating between such extremes, it is evident that apportioning the variations among hundreds of individual stocks would result in far wider differences. The unreported volume of trading in certain stocks could on occasion easily be as much as 50 per cent larger than now shown without exceeding the limit of possible variation in view of the fluctuation in the whole market.

Possibly the SEC will ultimately compile more accurate data on sales of individual stocks, as it is already doing for the complete market. If price-volume analysis has real significance, the results should be worth the effort required to develop and maintain a more thoroughgoing compilation.

New York Stock Exchange Sales (Number of shares)						
SEPTEMBER, 1939						
	SEC Total Round-lot Volume.	Annalist Floor Volume.	Indicated Stopped Sales and Other Unreported Transactions.	Total Odd-lot Dealers' Sales and Purchases, Divided by 2.	Total Volume not Included in Usual Figures.	Per Cent Unreported Volume of Floor Volume.
Sept.						
1.	2,148,330	1,966,380	181,950	226,956	408,906	20.8
2.	1,977,830	1,791,250	186,580	196,921	383,501	21.4
5.	6,608,710	5,932,150	676,560	641,563	1,318,123	22.2
6.	4,429,760	3,942,840	486,920	496,998	983,918	24.9
7.	2,820,240	2,597,280	222,960	284,012	506,972	19.5
8.	3,773,160	3,511,700	261,460	343,454	604,914	17.3
9.	1,740,060	1,555,390	184,670	197,085	381,755	24.6
11.	5,174,920	4,678,640	496,280	518,674	1,014,954	21.7
12.	4,696,335	4,168,560	527,775	505,351	1,033,126	22.0
13.	4,156,570	3,761,340	395,230	407,552	802,782	24.8
14.	2,175,095	2,007,510	167,585	245,101	412,686	19.0
15.	1,719,210	1,594,700	124,510	184,744	309,264	19.4
16.	1,197,220	1,084,280	112,940	136,368	249,308	23.0
18.	1,927,100	1,733,630	193,470	247,565	441,035	25.4
19.	1,985,970	1,832,630	153,340	205,476	358,816	19.6
20.	2,337,340	2,142,690	194,650	274,826	469,476	21.9
21.	1,842,840	1,731,300	111,540	192,577	304,117	17.6
22.	1,818,790	1,660,590	158,200	193,383	351,583	21.2
23.	609,480	562,460	47,020	70,665	117,685	20.9
25.	1,329,350	1,225,610	103,740	138,349	242,089	19.8
26.	1,857,150	1,712,670	144,480	164,816	309,296	18.1
27.	2,573,970	2,339,930	234,040	234,016	468,056	20.0
28.	1,721,200	1,573,930	147,270	176,032	323,302	20.5
29.	1,227,810	1,129,810	98,000	143,303	241,303	21.4
30.	906,860	843,340	63,520	96,967	160,487	19.0
	62,755,300	57,080,610	5,674,690	6,522,754	12,197,454	
	Per cent of monthly total floor volume.			9.9	11.4	21.3
DECEMBER, 1939						
1.	650,610	606,480	44,130	71,631	115,761	19.1
2.	246,370	228,100	18,270	32,470	50,740	22.2
4.	465,570	427,815	37,755	56,683	94,438	22.1
5.	641,890	589,620	52,000	66,441	118,511	20.1
6.	1,065,180	990,620	75,560	93,003	168,593	17.0
7.	1,121,520	1,005,470	118,580	94,585	210,445	20.9
8.	631,820	574,680	57,140	63,689	120,228	20.9
9.	290,950	261,220	32,781	62,001	23.7	
11.	629,270	567,100	62,170	70,808	132,978	23.5
12.	685,280	612,150	73,130	68,271	142,401	23.2
13.	1,155,520	1,061,150	94,370	92,320	186,690	17.6
14.	975,250	857,150	87,940	92,000	179,640	20.2
15.	775,640	704,480	69,180	70,712	139,872	19.9
16.	375,500	335,440	40,060	37,674	77,734	23.2
18.	804,220	718,840	85,380	75,555	160,938	22.4
19.	852,200	751,750	100,450	76,262	176,712	23.5
20.	1,013,650	908,620	105,030	81,999	187,028	20.6
21.	818,780	743,620	95,160	74,366	169,550	22.8
22.	816,810	719,520	97,380	71,738	160,128	23.5
23.	370,360	331,672	35,688	35,491	72,179	22.0
26.	842,450	724,070	118,380	75,557	198,937	26.8
27.	1,344,680	1,146,340	203,340	120,238	323,578	28.2
28.	1,199,200	1,080,680	118,520	107,316	225,836	20.9
29.	1,242,950	1,135,361	107,589	115,280	222,869	19.6
30.	746,670	655,955	90,715	60,794	151,509	23.1
	19,786,010	17,768,713	2,017,397	1,836,101	3,863,498	
	Per cent of monthly total floor volume.			11.4	10.3	21.7

AUG

National Government: Billion Dollar Diplomacy

WASHINGTON.

WITH all but the most pressing business suspended during the Washington heat wave of last week, progress toward the shaping of tax and draft bills has been slow and the defense program is further along only by an announcement or two.

More significant are the sudden moves in the foreign trade field. Although not directly related, the placing of oil and scrap iron under export license and the new export credit plan both trend toward the development of a closed economy within the Western Hemisphere.

It is not at once possible to visualize the full purpose of the President's request to increase the \$200,000,000 capital of the Export-Import Bank by another \$500,000,000. Timed at the peak of the Havana conference, it is an impressive gesture as to the Administration's willingness to lend generous aid to our southern neighbors. With the New Deal's well-known propensity for moving decimal points to the right, "dollar diplomacy" now becomes billion-dollar diplomacy.

Officials have indicated that the fund might be invested within a few months, in which case one would expect them to ask for more. The preamble of the measure introduced in both houses says the purpose is "to assist in the development of resources, the stabilization of the economies and the orderly marketing of products of the countries of the Western Hemisphere."

Otherwise the aims are vague, for understandable reasons. The cartel plan, which is being soft-pedaled at this time, although the preamble certainly seems broad enough to cover it, would be likely to rouse political opposition from the farm bloc, fearful as to the effects of what might be a sort of international Commodity Credit Corporation. It is, of course, from the Farm Belt that most of the opposition to the Hull trading policies has come, on grounds that other countries have been aided to the impairment of our own market.

From the labor slant, the possible financing of a steel industry and allied manufactures in Brazil might be a touchy subject. Investigation has shown this project feasible, provided one could be sure that some future government in Brazil would not decide to default on repayments. Experience indicates that, in the long run, industrialized nations become far better customers than undeveloped countries. But the immediate effect would probably be adverse to exports from some industries to Brazil and to countries which buy from Brazil.

Similarly the setting up of factories—aircraft plants, for example—in Canada, which may share in the program in a large way, would be likely to encounter opposition if the whole idea were known in advance.

In terms of Latin America, we discussed at some length last November the almost uniformly barren record of repayment on past loans, even though pledged or guaranteed by national and provincial governments. We made the point that, while large outlays might be justified on the basis of national defense policy, the idea was not attractive purely on an investment basis. No doubt Federal Loan Administrator Jones, who will control the plan, will make the same effort toward sound loans as in his domestic operations. Dealing through central banks rather than governments may prove a further protection.

It is to be expected, however, that Congress will not at once accept the full plan and that restrictive amendments will be

Seen for Latin America

By KENDALL K. HOYT

proposed. Our guess is that the measure will pass on the plea of defense but that there will be strong and possibly successful efforts to curtail the amount.

England, in recent years, has spent some £60,000,000 in so-called commercial loans to several countries, including Russia, Turkey, Czechoslovakia, China, Rumania, Greece and Poland. By and large, most of these countries played along with England as long as they were able. If intended mainly for good-will, an expenditure of a half billion by the United States may seem, by comparison, rather on the high side.

THE REPUBLICAN CAMPAIGN is gathering considerable momentum, although the formal beginning of the fight on national issues awaits Willkie's acceptance speech on Aug. 17. The fact that the press and the major commentators have turned almost solidly against the New Deal is a strong factor even prior to the completion of the details of organization. The rapid growth of Willkie clubs is a major political phenomenon.

For the first time, the New Deal is faced with an organized mass movement, and is currently powerless to fight back. As far as formal campaigning is concerned, it is the usual Democratic strategy to wait until close to election for its main effort. But intensive organization work down to

the precincts has usually gone before all that.

Now, there is a delay in organizing. Although a number of powerful State and local machines are functioning on their own, there is an apparent lack of centralized national direction which makes the New Deal vulnerable. For a time it was thought that attempts would be made to draft Farley for his genius in building a political machine. But it is currently believed that the breach between Farley and the New Deal has become too wide.

New political chiefs must therefore be chosen, with a likely shake-up in staff which might logically extend into the government service, where there are many who owe their allegiance to politicians who have turned against Roosevelt. It may take some time for the Democrats to work out of their current confusion and become effectively mobilized.

Unless the situation vastly changes before November the continuance of the New Deal will depend upon the ability of its leaders to organize a mass movement of their own. They are more experienced at this sort of thing than the Republican party workers, but time is needed. Meanwhile the voters enrolled by the Republicans as active workers are more likely to stick than if they were expected to do nothing except go to the polls on election

day. The outcome may well depend upon the speed with which organizations and counter-organizations on both sides are thrown into action.

BRITAIN'S PROSPECTS for holding out are viewed more optimistically in Washington than heretofore. There is too much propaganda in circulation for one to be certain. But Britain's apparent success in keeping control of the Mediterranean plus the brilliant performance of her air corps in actions against Germany have bolstered sentiment. There is no evidence that German bombings have done great damage to England or have impaired morale, which appears high, unlike the French situation prior to the invasion. Within a few weeks the fog and adverse weather will impair the effectiveness of air attacks and England might then have until Spring to improve her defenses.

National Legislation

Week Ended July 27

LAW WEEK Congress reconvened on Monday, July 22, after a recess from July 11 through the Democratic Convention. The Senate and House met Monday and Thursday, July 22 and 25, and adjourned to Monday, July 29.

NOMINATION—Robert Porter Patterson, N. Y., Assistant Secretary of War, vice Louis Johnson, resigned.

LAWS—Pub. Law No. 742 (S4097) Jul 12—Disposition of estates of American citizens who die abroad.

747 (S3131) Jul 18—Extend benefits of Employee Compensation Act to Reserve Corps.

749 (HR7233) Jul 18—Amend law authorizing sale of surplus real estate by paying salesmen's commissions.

750 (HR7696) Jul 18—Amend Grain Stds Act for grading of soy beans.

753 (S3046) Jul 19—Broaden Hatch Act to ban pernicious political activities by Stt employees paid by Fed Govt; place limits on election campaign expenditures.

755 (HR6884) Jul 19—Encourage travel in U S; create U S Travel Board in Interior Dept.

756 (HR8877) Jul 19—Put into effect charges for power at Boulder Dam.

757 (HR10100) Jul 19—Two-ocean Navy Expansion Bill; increase authorized composite of Navy; auth \$50,000,000 for essential equipment at either pvt or naval establishments.

Pub. Res. No. 94 (HJR582) Jul 18—Auth \$50,000,000 approp marine war risk insurance.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATION—H. Doc. 881, Jul 22—Message from President requesting \$500,000,000 additional capital for Export-Import Bank of Washington.

REPORTED—HR10200 (Vinson, Ga) HRpt 2800 Jul 25—Auth \$50,000,000 for constructs of naval pub works.

ADVERSE REPORT—HRes550 (Fish) HRpt 2800 Jul 22—Ask President for info as to any secret understanding with Russia.

NEW SENATE BILLS—S4204 (Glass for Wagner) Bnk & Currency—Increase lending authority of Export-Import Bank of Washington by \$500,000,000.

S4206 (Thomas, Okla) Indian Aff—Create Indian Claims Comm.

S4207 (Sheppard) Military Aff—Uniform procedure for temporary promotions in Army in time of emergency.

S4213-4 (Lee) Military Aff—Prevent profiteering; draft capital in wartime.

SRea292 (Byrd) On Table—Secy of Treasury prepare complete financial statement on Fed lending agencies.

NEW HOUSE BILLS—HR10212 (Steagall) Bnk & Currency—Increase capital Export-Import Bank.

HR10213 (Hennings) Forn Aff—Permit American vessels to assist in evacuating refugee children from war zones. Also HR10214 (Celler).

HR10220 (Cox) Military Aff—Create Natl Defense Adminstratn to coordinate preparedness activities.

HR10223 (Vinson, Ga) Naval Aff—Auth naval hospitals.

HR10224 (Vinson, Ga) Naval Aff—Establish minimum permanent authorized enlisted strength Marine Corps.

HR10225 (Wheeler) Educatn—Aid Stts in public educatn.

HJR585 (Dingell) Judic—Designate Aug 26 of each year as Natl Radio Day.

HRes556 (Hinshaw) Rules—Select committee invstg immigrants of war or political refugees.

HRes557 (Mrs. Rogers, Mass) Military Aff—President to transmit weekly report on progress of natl defense.

Continued on Page 167

Further Evidence as to Validity of Dow Theory; Earlier Attack Defended

By HERBERT G. LYTTLE

In a previous article¹ the writer analyzed the applicability of the last commonly accepted Dow bull and bear market signals to all the common stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange at the time those signals were given. It was natural for such an article to provoke favorable and unfavorable comment—all according to the sentiments, beliefs and experience of various readers. The criticisms of that article² exposed some apparent dissension among the ranks of Dow theorists as to when a major Dow signal was given and whether or not the major signal should be used. With these dissensions the writer is not interested, it being his purpose to disclose, from a statistical analysis of the recorded and accepted major Dow signals, just how many stocks responded favorably and unfavorably within those time limits. Were he to work on "detected implications" of the Dow theory he would be without any recognized standard to limit and define the conditions of the study.

In this short study the same general method was used. The bull and bear market signals are those of the late Robert Rhea's, which in turn, it is believed, confirm Mr. Hamilton's, and are the bull markets commencing with June 28, 1897, and ending Sept. 8, 1937—or ten bull markets. As in the last study, theoretical purchases were made the first market day following the signal—one purchase being made at the low of that day and another at the high. Theoretical sales were made the first market day following a bear signal—one at the low and the other at the high of the day. These purchases and sales were combined as follows: it was considered that one was fortunate to have bought at the lowest price and sold at the highest price, which would have given the very best possible results, and the alternate was that one was unfortunate enough to have purchased at the highest price and sold at the lowest price, which obviously would have given the very worst possible results. The previous study considered every common stock on the New York Stock Exchange. In this study the common stocks used were those which enjoyed a weekly volume of sales of 2,000 shares or more. Thus the number used varied from sixty-four stocks in the market of June 28, 1897, to 422 in the market of May 25, 1933.

As stated above, the purpose is to show from the record how applicable the major Dow signals have been to a broad list of stocks. In other words, what have been the chances of success of a prospective purchaser left to himself (and the Dow theory does leave him to pick his own stocks) to select stocks which will show a profit? It is assumed herein that a successful market signal must give a buyer something much better than an even chance to buy a stock when conditions are supposed, by that signal, to be correct.

Successful in First Four Bull Markets

The first four bull markets can only be classified as very successful and correct. The lowest percentage of correctness for the so-called "best" purchaser was 81 per cent, i. e., eight out of any ten stocks purchased would have been profitable. The highest was 91 per cent correctness, or nine out of any ten stocks purchased. The lowest percentage of correctness for the "worst" purchaser was 77 per cent and the highest 91 per cent. Breaking those markets down into "rails" and "industrials" discloses that in the second bull market (October, 1900, to June, 1903) the industrials exhibited a weakness. In that

market the "best" purchaser of industrial stocks only would have been but 66 per cent correct and the "worst" purchaser in that group would have been 60 per cent correct. With this one exception the percentage of correctness for these first four markets can be accurately described as correct and may be sufficiently substantiated by their average percentages as in Table I.

TABLE I. FIRST FOUR BULL MARKETS

	Percentage Correct.
All Stocks:	
Best purchaser.....	87
Worst purchaser.....	85
Rails:	
Best purchaser.....	92
Worst purchaser.....	91
Industrials:	
Best purchaser.....	84
Worst purchaser.....	79

As for the next four bull markets, the story is quite different and the results of the study would seem to classify them definitely as unsuccessful. The lowest percentage of correctness of the so-called "best" purchaser was 40 per cent, or 6 out of any 10 stocks would have resulted in a loss. The highest percentage of correctness was 55 per cent, or 5½ stocks out of any 10 would have been profitable. The lowest percentage of correctness of the so-called "worst" purchaser was 35 per cent, or 6½ out of any 10 stocks purchased would have been a loss, and his highest percentage of correctness was 55 per cent—the same as the "best" purchaser.

Failure in Four Markets

In these latter four markets the uniformity of performance of the rails and industrials was not maintained. In the eighth bull market (Feb., 1922 to June, 1923) the rails gave a better account of themselves than the industrials. In the sixth and seventh bull markets the industrials gave a much better performance than the rails and made that group classify itself as correct by 67 per cent. Here again the percentage correctness of the fifth to and including the eighth bull markets can be sufficiently substantiated by their average percentages as in Table II.

The ninth bull market, ending in 1929,

was without any doubt as correct as any of the first four. The tenth bull market ending in 1939 was correct, in so far as the industrials were concerned, the "best" purchaser in that list having a 72 per cent correctness and the "worst" a 69 per cent correctness. The rails in that market were as follows: "best" purchaser was 38 per cent correct; "worst" purchaser was 28 per cent correct.

In the above study and the earlier one in *The Annalist* of July 4, 1940, are the facts as to the applicability of major Dow signals to a very broad list of common stocks. It is not to be considered as a basis for comparison with the theoretical results of twenty or thirty selected stocks which are sometimes changed between signals. The results of this study seem

TABLE II. SECOND FOUR BULL MARKETS

	Percentage Correct.
All Stocks:	
Best purchaser.....	47
Worst purchaser.....	43
Rails:	
Best purchaser.....	42
Worst purchaser.....	38
Industrials:	
Best purchaser.....	59
Worst purchaser.....	54

to force an objective observer to the conclusion that in its earliest stages the Dow theory was definitely workable when applied to a broad list of stocks, but that more recently it has lost its efficacy and is more apt to make the stock buyer "Be a Sheep and he will meet the Butcher." It would seem that Dow advocates will have to give more than verbal assertions, which happen to be in happy accord with their sentiments, to prove that major Dow signals mark the entrance and exit of green pastures for a broad list of common stocks.

The More the Merrier

To the Editor of *The Annalist*:

May one more log be added to Dow Theory fire?

It would seem as if both the critics of Mr. Lyttle's conclusion in his article "The Dow Theory Successful in Only Two Out of Eight Bull Markets Since 1910" and Mr. Lyttle himself missed the real point

at issue. Whether the dates chosen by Mr. Lyttle are incorrect as asserted by Mr. Wood or that one must pick the "right" stock as implied by Mr. Barbour is not, however, to be gainsaid. The real issue would seem to be whether the Dow Jones averages are truly representative of the market. On that score there can be no doubt. The Dow Jones averages themselves in the 1939-40 period indicated losses from trading on the average. It would seem to be a high tribute to the Dow Jones averages that they so accurately portrayed the action of the market generally. Mr. Lyttle rendered a service in demonstrating this.

Let us look at the record. Mr. Lyttle chose the dates of April 1, 1939, July 17, 1939, and May 14, 1940. On July 17, 1939, when the movement of the averages was said to have indicated the beginning of a primary bull market the industrials stood at 142.58, the railroads at 29.14, and the utilities at 25.5. On May 14, 1940, when the movement of the averages was said to have indicated the beginning of a primary bear market the industrials stood at 128.27, the railroads at 26.23 and the utilities at 20.90. Now it will be obvious that on May 14, 1940, when a primary bear market was said to have been indicated the averages were below the level of the averages of July 17, 1939, all of which suggest that any purchase on July 17 followed by sale on July 14, 1940, would have been at a loss. Mr. Lyttle proves it. Contra-wise when the averages were said to have indicated a primary bear market on April 1, 1939 (industrials 132.83; railroads 27.24; utilities 22.50), the level of the averages was below the level of the averages on July 17, 1940 when they were said to have indicated the beginning of a bull market all of which as Mr. Lyttle shows would have been to the profit of a trader who purchased stocks when sale would have been called and sold the stocks in July when purchase would have been called for!

It may be doubted whether it is a fault of the Dow Theory that trading has been so dull and the movement of the market so narrow that trends cannot be discerned in time to afford protection to traders.

HERBERT W. ROOT.

Hartford, Conn., July 16.

Recent Books on Commerce, Finance and Economics

MILK DISTRIBUTION AS A PUBLIC UTILITY

By W. P. Mortensen

This is the result of a research project (wouldn't you know it?) carried on by the Agricultural Experiment Station of the University of Wisconsin over a period of four years. The object was to find out whether important savings could be effected by turning the business of milk distribution into a public utility; i. e., instead of being awakened every morning by half a dozen competing milkmen the consumer would be awakened by only one, who would be employed by a monopolistic combination regulated by some government agency, the same as the telephone and electric light companies. A vast amount of statistical material on the operation of milk distributors in Wisconsin was collected and analyzed. It was found that an efficiently operated, unified system of milk distribution could theoretically bring about a saving of 1½ to 2 or perhaps 2½ cents per quart in milk distribution costs. But the author does not say how Nancy, who was brought up on Becker's milk, would be persuaded to drink Consolidated milk, which might taste like Borden's; or how Marjorie, who was

brought up on Borden's, would be persuaded to drink Consolidated, if peradventure Consolidated were to taste like Becker's. One has to be a parent to understand some of these obtuse economic problems. (University of Chicago Press, \$2.50.)

THE FEDERAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM

By Daniel T. Selko

Morris L. Ernst in his recent book *Too Big* listed the Federal Government among the things he thinks are too big. Wendell L. Willkie has recently pointed out the desirability of honest bookkeeping in the Federal Government. Hence, from the standpoint of current popular interest, as well as the importance of the subject itself, Mr. Selko's objective analysis of the Federal financial system is well worth reading.

The book is worth while for at least two other reasons. First, it discusses fundamental principles, points out ways in which practice departs from sound theory and offers practical suggestions for remedial action. Second, it is a storehouse of information for those who think they already know all about the subject but will no doubt be prompt to agree that

they still had much to learn about the technique of government financial operations after they have read even a small portion of this book. It follows, of course, that for those who know little about the subject, but who ought or would like to be well informed, the book is required reading. (Brookings Institution, Washington, \$3.50.)

WHAT GERMANY FORGOT

By James T. Shotwell

This loosely knit but interesting volume seeks to dispose of the charge that Germany's post-war economic difficulties were wholly attributable to the Versailles treaty. What he discusses at length is the fact that Germany had been engaged in a major war that had drained her economic resources and left her virtually prostrate, and that it fundamentally misrepresents the situation to lay this solely to the post-war settlement. He notes, among other things, that foreign investors paid into Germany, in the form of loans, the equivalent of all that Germany paid out on reparations, thus leaving the cost of the war itself as the real burden. (Macmillan, \$1.50.)

¹ *THE ANNALIST*, July 4, 1940, p. 7.

² Cf. *THE ANNALIST* of July 11, 1940, p. 38, and of July 25, 1940, p. 108.

Europe's Changing Economic Structure: Three Major Long-Run Problems

By PETER F. DRUCKER*

Author of "The End of Economic Man," Etc.

DURING the last months, since the war began, a great many blueprints for the future organization of Europe have been published both in this country and abroad. The great majority of them were based upon a reorganization of the European or of the world economy. What I want to discuss today has very little connection with these ambitious plans. I am so certain that Europe is faced with a long period of wars and revolutions that the making of blueprints for a future permanent peace appears to me to be extremely premature.

But even if the time should be ripe for a peace plan, to start from the economic angles seems to me to be impractical. Economics are only one of four major problems which will have to be settled if Europe wants to regain peace and some degree of stability. The social and the political problems and perhaps the most important one—the metaphysical problem of common beliefs and common convictions—are just as important today as the economic one. And since all these problems are inter-dependent they cannot be treated or solved independently.

Nevertheless, while a solution of the economic problems of Europe alone would not solve the European trouble, no such solution is possible without economic reorganization, and I therefore propose today to discuss those economic factors which are actual threats to the political and social stability of Europe and for which, therefore, there will have to be some sort of solution if Europe is to regain stability and peace. But let me emphasize at the outset that I have no solution to offer and that, moreover, I am extremely suspicious of all programs which attempt to solve the extremely complex European problem by means of one set formula. I feel that ambitious programs which proclaim to contain the solution for centuries are very much out of order just now.

Europe's Competitive Position

The most obvious and most important of the economic realities of the European situation today is the steady deterioration of Europe's competitive position in the world. It would be almost impossible to prove this deterioration by statistical figures. Yet the deterioration is neither imaginary nor intangible, but very real and very tangible. It does not so much consist in a loss of markets for European goods. Its main aspect is the complete change in the function of Europe in the world economy. And the main factor in the change has not been the growth of the United States to economic world power but the development of the formerly colonial regions of South America, Asia and Africa into adolescent, if not yet mature, economies.

It is not generally realized that the economic position of Europe during the nineteenth century did not rest so much on its manufacturing as on the services rendered by Europe to the colonial world. Manufacturing profits, while great, always tended to become stabilized and were not, therefore, a real source of new capital. But the income from the services—from insurance, banking, shipping and wholesale trade—gave Europe a genuine entrepreneurial profit, and that meant a constant source of new capital, and a real profit in the sense in which economic theory uses that word.

On these international services Europe built up an economic position comparable to that of the senior partner in a business,

who not only shares in the profits of the business proportionate to his share in the work and in the capital, but who, in addition, obtains a large slice of the profits by virtue of his seniority alone. And it is this seniority that Europe has lost.

That Europe has also to fight with increasing competition on the part of the new industries in the former colonial economies adds to the troubles of Europe, but does not cause them. As a whole, European exports have been very well maintained. And the manufacturing profits obtained from producing these exports out of imported raw material have not been diminished seriously. But the service income and the central position of Europe based on this service income have almost disappeared. And Europe can neither keep her population nor maintain her present economic organization without this service income.

Intra-European Changes

Parallel to that deterioration in Europe's international economic position there has been an internal shift in the position of the main economic powers in Europe in relation to others. The most important of these shifts is the steady deterioration of England's position and the gradual rise of Germany to economic leadership in Europe. England's troubles spring largely from the international changes which I just discussed, as England was pre-eminently a service-economy. In addition, the typical English overseas exports—coal, cotton textiles and ships—are the ones which are first replaced when a former purely agricultural economy begins to industrialize itself.

But the causes for the shift are even more profound and are to be found in the changes of modern technology and modern industry. The production of standard goods in a multitude of small businesses—the typical organization of English industry—is more and more replaced by the production of highly integrated and highly complicated goods by large integrated concerns such as you find in the chemical or metallurgical industries today. This is a form of industrial production for which the English with their traditional antipathy against over-organization and regimented planning are not well suited. Even today the English chemical industry works to an astonishing extent with German or Swiss chemists. It is freely admitted in England that, but for the stream of German refugee chemists, England would not have been able to build her plants for synthetic oil, which may well become of vital importance in the present war.

Germany, on the other hand, has a peculiar aptitude for large business organization, for large-scale team-work in research, and for the coordination of producing units in one large-scale combine. As a result of these changes, you have, in the first place, the problem of England where about half the population has been dependent on the export of bulk goods or on the income from international services—both sources of income which tend to dry up increasingly. And on the other hand, you have the problem of the German economy, which, in view of its large-scale organization and over-organization, can only be run efficiently if run at full capacity. The pressure of German economic expansion tends, therefore, always to reach the explosion point, especially as

outside world will become almost completely "managed trade"—which means trade on the basis of clearing agreements, barter deals and similar innovations. And this means in turn that the European income from international services will necessarily dwindle and perhaps disappear completely.

These consequences are to be expected in any event. If the democracies win they will have saved their political freedom, but they will not have been able to do so without making these economic sacrifices for the sake of their freedom. I do not see any formula for the solution of these economic problems. A European customs union or a European federation would not help the peasant countries unless provisions were made for large-scale emigration from these countries and for a large-scale inflow of capital into them.

In addition, federation would not solve the problem of England's economic position. On the contrary, a customs union or a European economic federation would at once establish a German hegemony over Europe largely at the expense of England and of the small former neutral countries in Western and Northern Europe. I believe it is symptomatic that the German peace terms, as reported in the American press, envisage a European economic union, whereas the English have been very careful not to commit themselves in any way to such a scheme although the French Government was reported to be in favor of it. England could not possibly accept such a scheme except under duress, as it would accelerate the English economic deterioration. And the same with some minor differences goes for any other scheme that provides for a European or a world-wide economic union at the present time. Such a union must necessarily hasten the decline of that partner who is already declining. In the case of a world union that would be the whole of Europe; in the case of a European union it would be England and the European middle classes. And for that reason alone I am not particularly happy about attempts to solve the world problem or the European problem by means of a grand conception which may well achieve just the contrary of what its proponents believe it will do.

I know that I have not been comforting to you and that my attitude as well as my analysis must displease those of you who want a cut-and-dried solution. It seems to me to be the most prominent and most tragic characteristic of the times through which we pass that there is no possibility for such a total solution. But that does not mean that we have to despair. It only means that the real solution for the problems of Europe can not be found in the mechanic spheres of human existence such as that of economic or social organization but that the real solution must come from a sphere far more profound and far more important—namely, from that of the fundamental beliefs and concepts, whether those be religious, social or political.

Post-War Europe

To the Editor of *The Annalist*:


In your issue of June 20 there appeared a well-written article on the probable consequences of a Hitler victory on the economy of the United States. Based on certain premises, it moved forward with true German logic to the end of an economic machine controlled by Hitler, functioning according to rules and regulations and actively engaged in commerce throughout its European bloc and exporting to the rest of the world—all of this to be done

*An address before the Institute of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, June 19, 1940.

Financial Markets: Favorable Earnings and Dividends Bring Higher Stock Prices

STOCK prices have at last broken out of their trading range. Under heavier volume leading issues advanced during the week to a level above the mid-June supply points reaching the highest prices since the middle of May.

The best gains of the week have been in Chrysler, Westinghouse, du Pont, Sears Roebuck, American Smelting and Refining, American Telephone, New York Central, Union Pacific, International Harvester, U. S. Steel, Bethlehem Steel and General Electric. The container stocks, Woolworth, General Foods, National Biscuit, Corn Products, Loew's, the aircraft manufacturing group, the tobacco stocks and most of the utilities made only moderate gains.



Earnings reports have continued generally favorable and in the case of several leading companies have apparently had some effect upon stock prices during the past week. Bethlehem Steel has reported first-half earnings amounting to \$6.09 per share of common stock, as compared with \$0.78 per share in the first half of 1939, while Chrysler Corporation reported the best first half year in its history, with earnings of \$7.01 per share, against \$5.83 per share in the similar 1939 period.

On the other hand, second-quarter results of General Motors showed earnings of \$1.02 per common share as compared with \$1.06 per share in the second quarter of 1939, this less favorable record reflecting contingency reserves provided out of earnings against additional taxes and future losses resulting from conditions abroad. These charges against earnings are of special interest to investors because they suggest the possibility that final results of many companies for the full year 1940 may be rather seriously affected by unfavorable influences resulting from the war.

Among dividends announced during the past week have been a \$2 payment on American Locomotive preferred stock, \$1.25 per share on Bethlehem Steel and \$1 on U. S. Steel common stocks.

Continued optimistic trade reports from



	1940					
24.....	106.37	103.73	102.52	105.82		
25.....	106.37	103.88	102.52	105.88	105.28	
26.....	106.56	104.07	102.80	105.92	106.25	
27.....	106.58	103.98	102.80	105.92	105.18	
28.....	106.54	104.37	102.05	106.17	105.18	
29.....	106.54	104.37	102.05	106.17	105.18	
30.....	106.54	104.37	102.05	106.24	105.38	

the steel industry have been given considerable publicity in financial circles. There may also be noted a slightly firmer tendency in copper prices, reflected in an advance from 10½ to 10¾ cents a pound by custom smelters and small producers.

The market's advance during the week has pushed Chrysler, General Motors, Bethlehem Steel, Westinghouse, General Electric, du Pont, Montgomery Ward, Sears Roebuck, American Telephone, Johns-Manville and Union Pacific up through their mid-June high points. The ability of these leading stocks to advance beyond this critical level and the moderate


increase in volume that accompanied the break-through constitute a favorable development from a technical standpoint. It may also be noted that most stocks held their ground fairly well between the rise that occurred during the first half of June and the beginning of the advance of the past few days, and that the volume of trading was extremely light during this period.

The market's advance apparently did not relate to any particular news development. It is true that second-quarter earnings statements have been generally favorable and that in most cases there was

greater resistance than might have been expected to the second-quarter downward movement in general business activity. On the other hand, the European situation continues disturbing and the extent of the damage that will be done by excess profits taxes cannot yet be estimated. Probably the chief factor in the market's advance is the low level of stock prices in relation to dividends and earnings.

It must be noted that the market's advance has not been particularly broad. Leading issues have made fairly impressive gains, but there are many issues that remain below the best levels of the past six weeks. If the advance is to continue it may be expected to broaden out to include issues which have up to now remained inactive.

M. C.



AIIIG

States Government lending farmers 87 cents a bushel for standard wheat and the Canadian Government guaranteeing growers 70 cents for the same grade, any severe price decline appears unwarranted.

Many times last week corn took the leadership away from wheat. Aided by a heat wave which sent the mercury soaring over the 100 mark several days in a row, corn futures rose more than 3 cents a bushel in heavy dealings. At the highs, quotations were 6 cents above the lows of the preceding week. Profit-taking shaded prices a good deal, however, and final prices were up only fractions.

One Chicago observer asserted that corn was in a "weather" market. Continued heat and lack of rain probably will send prices sky-high. Heavy rains may bring about a recession. In many parts of the Corn Belt rain is urgently needed.

In contrast to traders and speculators, farmers showed willingness to sell corn last week. Observers said this did not indicate anything bearish in the outlook but rather reflected the acute shortage of storage space.

Cash oats lost almost 2 cents a bushel last week on continued heavy receipts. The expiring July contract was also hit by cash selling. Other options, however, scored fractional gains. Trade reports indicate that farmers may stage an extensive "hold back" movement in an effort to boost prices to a more attractive level.

SUGAR

Spot raw sugar sold for 2.63 cents a pound last week, the lowest level reached since December, 1934. This decline in raw sugar brought renewed weakness into the refined market and on Monday of this week all leading refiners cut their price 15 points to 4.35 cents a pound. Southern refiners led the parade by slashing their price to 4.20 cents, as compared with the old 4.35 and 4.50 rates.

Futures declined under the deluge of bad news. "U. S." options lost 4 to 5 points last week with the longest term option falling to a new low for the season.

The current weakness in sugar prices is somewhat disconcerting, especially if the war is taken into account. During the World War period, sugar prices soared from 3 to 24 cents a pound. The second World War saw sugar rise from 1.90 cents last August to almost 3 cents a few weeks later. By the end of October, 1939, prices were back to five-year lows. Current quotations are not much better.

There are two principal reasons for the present unsatisfactory performance. First, world supplies of sugar are ample. Unless the vast sugar fields of Cuba, the Philippines and the United States are overrun by an invader, they promise to remain ample. Second, almost all warring nations accumulated vast reserves before this war began so instead of an increase in demand after the war there has actually been a decline.

Trade reports indicate that there will be a domestic surplus of about 250,000 tons of sugar this year. Ordinarily this amount would not cause any uneasiness, but under the quota system—where all producers are required to ship their quotas—it can cause extreme unsettlement in the market. Unless the Secretary of Agriculture soon revises the quota a further decline in prices appears inevitable. Many sugar brokers are afraid that Secretary Wallace will be too busy getting himself elected to worry about the sugar trade.

COCOA

As was generally expected, cocoa futures declined to new season lows last week. Active contracts dropped 27 to 30 points to reach the lowest territory witnessed since before the war broke out last September. On Monday of this week the decline was extended with all options hitting new lows. Strangely enough, volume of trading did not expand on the decline.

This fact was the only cheering item the bulls could feast upon.

The principal cause of last week's decline was continuous selling from Brazil. Brazilian planters have been selling for several weeks despite repeated rumors that they were to receive government loans on their cocoa crop. Last week, however, it was reliably reported that Brazilian authorities thought it was "very difficult" to consider minimum prices or support under present conditions.

In addition to Brazilian selling, the domestic chocolate trade has had to contend with greatly increased arrivals from West Africa. Several steamers have been added to the route and rates have been reduced. Both of these items have served to boost Accra exports to the highest levels in years.

WOOL TOPS

A wave of speculative enthusiasm swept the wool top market last week and futures were pushed up 5 to 6 cents a pound before any profit taking appeared. Volume reached 2,660,000 pounds, almost double the preceding week and the best in about four weeks. Prices moved up to the highest level in more than a month.

Reasons for the sudden rise in prices were not immediately apparent. Trade circles, however, expressed the belief that the buying was in anticipation of large purchases to meet defense requirements. Just why this "anticipation" should break loose last week was not explained. The government's orders, incidentally, will amount to about 10 per cent of our normal annual consumption.

In marked contrast to the raw wool market, goods were very quiet. Sales were scattered and mostly for fill-in purposes. The unusually hot weather of the last few weeks obviously has taken the minds of woolen goods buyers away from their business.

RUBBER

Futures held in a narrow range last week, with final prices little changed. Trading was light. On Monday, though, a burst of selling carried prices down as much as 75 points. Selling was traced to holders who desired to get out of July contracts. The liquidation in that option forced other futures lower.

Trade news continues favorable. The Rubber Manufacturers Association reports that June tire shipments were 6,719,000 casings, a gain of 15 per cent over a year ago and the largest for that month since 1932. The shifted automobile model year plays a large part in the fact that shipments were the best since 1932.

Most automobile plants are now closed down for the annual change-over period. Within a few weeks 1941 models will be rolling off the production lines in volume. This will mean greatly increased demand for rubber, but whether there will be any effect upon prices remains to be seen.

Reflecting a good automobile year—as well as sharply higher consumption of non-automotive tires—domestic consumption of crude rubber in the first six months of this year was 303,000 tons, a gain of 8 per cent as compared with last year and one of the best semi-annual periods in history.

SILK

The September option rose 3 cents in light dealings, but other futures either stood still or did not trade at all. Current prices are slightly above the lows of the year.

Trade news is poor. Several specialty shops in the metropolitan area have cut Nylon hose to below \$1 a pair. If the trend is maintained—and there is no reason for expecting that it will not—Nylons may soon be selling for 69 cents and silk will have lost up to 80 per cent of the stocking market. That is about the only market the commodity has left.

LA RUE APPLEGATE.

COMMODITY FUTURE PRICES

(Grains at Chicago; Others at New York)

Daily Range

	October	December	January	March	May	July
Cotton—New:	High. Low.	High. Low.	High. Low.	High. Low.	High. Low.	High. Low.
July 22	9.35	9.28	9.22	9.15	8.93	8.81
July 23	9.30	9.27	9.18	9.10	8.96	8.77
July 24	9.44	9.33	9.29	9.14	9.14	8.98
July 25	9.48	9.40	9.35	9.27	9.11	8.94
July 26	9.44	9.43	9.35	9.29	9.13	8.95
July 27	9.44	9.39	9.29	9.26	9.15	9.07
July 27 close	9.49	9.27	9.35	9.14	9.15	9.06
Week's range	9.53	9.28	9.41	9.15	9.30	9.20
Previous week	9.53	9.28	9.30	9.10	9.20	9.02
Contract	10.29	8.25	10.18	8.33	10.14	8.26
range	Ap. 17	No. 1 Ap. 17	Je. 6 Ap. 17	Je. 6 Ap. 17	My. 18 Je. 20	Jl. 26 Jl. 23

Old and New Contracts: Traded week ended Friday, July 26, 140,800 bales; previous week, 221,400; year ago, 764,300.

	July	Sept.	Dec.	May
	High. Low.	High. Low.	High. Low.	High. Low.
Wheat:				
July 22	.73%	.71%	.74%	.75%
July 23	.72%	.71%	.73%	.75%
July 24	Exp. July 23	.74%	.73%	.75%
July 25				
July 26				
July 27				
July 27 close				
Week's range				
Previous week				
Contract	1.11%	.71%	1.11%	.73
range	Ap. 22	Jl. 23 Ap. 18	Jl. 23 My. 27	Jl. 23 Jl. 24

Wheat: Traded week ended Friday, July 26, 74,864,000 bushels; previous week, 74,106,000; year ago 149,923,000.

Weekly Range

	Week Ended	Week Ended	Week Ended
	July 27, 1940	July 20, 1940	July 29, 1939
Corn:	High. Low. Last.	High. Low. High. Date.	Low. Date. High. Low.
July	.63% .62%	Exp. July 22 .63% .60%	.52% Oct. 23 .38%
Sept.	.62% .60%	.60% t	.52% May 18 .42%
Dec.	.59% .55%	.57% t	.53% June 12 .33%
May	.61% .59%	.59% t	.61% July 24 .45%
*Bushels traded	25,201,000	17,773,000	46,137,000

	Oats:	Week Ended	Week Ended	Week Ended
	July	Sept. 20, 1940	Contract	Range
July	30%	.28%	Exp. July 23	.31% .30%
Sept.	.29%	.27%		.35% .38%
Dec.	.30%	.29%		.34% .38%
May	.31%	.31%		.31% .31%
*Bushels traded	4,625,000	3,302,000		12,780,000

	Rye:	Week Ended	Week Ended	Week Ended
	July	Sept. 20, 1940	Contract	Range
July	.44% .41%	Exp. July 23	.43% .41%	.76% July 1 .27%
Sept.	.45%	.43% t	.45% t	.42% July 25 .24%
Dec.	.47%	.45% t	.48% t	.42% June 29 .41%
May	.50%	.48% t	.49% t	.48% July 25 .44%
*Bushels traded	2,749,000	2,625,000		4,766,000

	Coffee:	Week Ended	Week Ended	Week Ended
	July	Sept. 24, 1940	Contract	Range
July				
Sept.	4.42	4.09 4.10 n	4.61	4.34 4.35
Dec.	4.51	4.23 4.24 n	4.73	4.47 4.50
Jan.				
Mar.	4.63	4.35 4.36 t	4.83	4.60 4.65
May	4.73	4.45 4.45 n	4.93	4.70 4.76
July 1941	4.56	4.54 4.55 t	5.00	4.84 5.00
Contracts traded	864		1,416	

	Coffee—D (Santos No. 4):	Week Ended	Week Ended	Week Ended
	July	Sept. 24, 1940	Contract	Range
July	5.68	5.62	Exp. July 25	5.61 5.61
Sept.	5.74	5.64		5.63 5.63
Dec.	5.94	5.91		5.85 5.85
Mar.	6.10	6.05		6.05 6.05
May	6.22	6.10	6.10/6.11	6.13 6.11
Contracts traded	97		102	

	Copper:	Week Ended	Week Ended	Week Ended
	July	Sept. 24, 1940	Contract	Range
July				
Sept.	9.42	8.49 8.50 n	9.61	8.41 8.45
Dec.	9.51	9.23 9.24 n	9.73	8.50 8.55
Jan.				
Mar.	9.63	9.35 9.36 t	9.83	8.60 8.65
May	9.73	9.45 9.45 n	10.00	8.70 8.75
July 1941	9.56	9.54 9.55 t	10.50	8.48 8.52
Contracts traded	864		1,416	

	Coffee—E (No. 7):	Week Ended	Week Ended	Week Ended
	July	Sept. 25, 1940	Contract	Range
July				
Sept.	3.93	3.90 3.91 n	4.61	3.44 3.45
Dec.	4.03	3.97 3.98 n	4.73	3.46 3.47
Mar.				
June	4.18	4.18 4.19 n	5.33	3.43 3.44
Contracts traded	309		190	

	Hides:	Week Ended	Week Ended	Week Ended
	Sept.	Oct. 1, 1940	Contract	Range

Removal of British War Industries to Canada Urged; New Wheat Processing Tax

MONG the interesting developments coming out of the war situation is the recent discussion in business and financial circles of the proposed movement of industry from the United Kingdom to Canada. It appears that the original proposal came from the Financial Post and was subsequently taken up by Gordon Bongard, president of the Toronto Stock Exchange, and Herbert A. Bruce in the House of Commons.

The proposal has been restricted to war (and export) industries only. The idea is to transplant British arms and munitions industries in Canada beyond the reach of Nazi bombers. The proposal has a good deal of merit in it. But it is difficult for one to tell the difference between transplanting industry and what is going on in Canada right now. Nor does it seem that much more could be done than is being accomplished at present.

The Canadian Government and Canadian industry are both increasing the capacity of the war industries as fast as new plants can be constructed and new machinery built and delivered. The difficulties of housing the transplanted industries would be the same as those attending the expansion of war plants at present. The problem just now appears to be one of new factory construction—a problem that would remain if British munition-making machinery and workers were brought over from abroad.


The crying need at this juncture is increased plant capacity for making more guns, tanks, airplanes and ships. Transplanting industries from Britain does not increase that capacity, it merely transfers its location. It would also involve delay which would mean time lost in production. And time at this moment is of the essence,

THE ANNALIST INDEX OF CANADIAN BUSINESS ACTIVITY

(Adjusted for seasonal variation and long-time trend)

	June, 1940.	May, 1940.	June, 1939.
Freight car loadings	75.5	72.3	59.6
Electric power production	98.1	95.4	89.3
Automobile production	89.1	82.3	60.8
Newspaper production	86.1	80.5	65.6
Steel ingot production	145.6	134.4	93.5
Pig iron production	109.4	114.7	66.5
Coal production	113.4	98.3	—
Rubber imports	53.3	44.5	—
Cotton imports	195.3	—	—
Flour production	86.8	86.6	—
Cattle slaughtered	50.8	49.5	113.9
Hogs slaughtered	156.1	187.9	104.3
Board and plank exports	94.7	111.8	—
Building permits	125.6	36.5	27.0
Combined index	**85.8	80.0	—

*Subject to revision. †Revised.



As a long-range proposal, that is if the Nazi blitzkrieg is thwarted and the war becomes a long one, removing munition plant equipment and skilled workers is

of considerable merit. Production delays brought about by air bombings and air raid alarms could be reduced to a minimum or eliminated altogether. Even here it

would appear to be more feasible to increase the capacity of Canadian war-making industries rather than to transfer the British plants. It might, however, be very advantageous for Canada to "import" skilled English technicians and workers for training purposes (or for actual operations when the destruction of a plant puts such men out of work).

WHOLESALE COMMODITY PRICES

	July 19, 1940.	July 12, 1940.	July 21, 1939.
All commodities	82.0	81.7	72.8
Vegetable products	70.6	70.5	60.3
Animal products	77.2	77.2	71.4
Textile products	83.1	83.2	66.5
Wood and paper	89.0	88.4	77.1
Iron products	102.6	102.6	97.4
Nonferrous metals	76.1	76.3	68.5
Nonmetallic minerals	89.7	88.7	84.6
Chemicals	88.8	87.1	77.6
Canadian farm products	64.2	65.0	63.1
Industrial materials	77.2	77.1	65.0
Sensitive commodities	85.3	85.7	83.9

Wood-Gundy Index for July 24, 1940; July 17, 1940, and July 26, 1939.

The need for additional man power to operate Canada's rapidly expanding war-making facilities is obvious to any one taking the time to read the monthly employment reports of the Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Some answer to the need for more men in industry can be found from an analysis of the agricultural situation. The 1940 wheat crop is estimated at between 350,000,000 and 400,000,000 bushels, with the carry-over of wheat amounting to approximately 295,000,000 bushels, of which 270,000,000 are now in storage in Canada. This year's crop is estimated at 400,000,000 bushels, which after deducting Great Britain's requirements in the amount of 200,000,000 and domestic consumption of 50,000,000 bushels will mean another carry-over of 150,000,000 bushels by July, 1941, in addition to the current surplus, making a possible carry-over of 400,000,000 bushels in all. This would be about equal to British requirements for two years.

Obviously there is an overwhelming

FREIGHT CAR LOADINGS

	Week Ended	July 20, 1940.	July 13, 1940.	July 22, 1939.
Grain and products	7,538	7,417	6,380	—
Livestock	1,481	1,444	1,513	—
Coal	5,590	6,088	5,086	—
Coke	761	553	300	—
Lumber	4,144	3,968	3,364	—
Pulpwood	814	1,873	1,615	—
Pulp and paper	2,903	2,903	1,980	—
Other forest products	2,148	2,172	2,790	—
Ore	3,750	3,607	2,793	—
Co. c. i. merchandise	12,868	13,033	12,479	—
Miscellaneous	14,180	14,308	12,247	—
Total	57,125	57,238	47,687	—
Total;	95.0	93.7	79.3	—

1926=100; adjusted for seasonal variation.

Week Ended

Transactions on the Toronto Stock Exchange

Saturday, July 27

CANADIAN STOCKS

INQUIRIES INVITED

A. E. AMES & CO.
INCORPORATED

TWO WALL STREET, NEW YORK

STOCK EXCHANGE STOCKS

Sales. High. Low. Last.

1,000 *Abitibi ... 100 85 85

370 Abitibi 6%pr ... 4% 3% 3%

35 APGraIn pr 27 ... 23 27

1,200 *Aldermac ... 11 11 11

1,000 *Am. Gold ... 9 9 9

2,400 *Anglo Hur. 150 150 150

7,000 *Armfield ... 4% 4% 4%

2,000 *Ashley ... 3 3 3

4,284 *Aunoy ... 122 116 121

2,200 *Bankfield ... 104 9% 9%

51 Bank Mont. 181 180 180

14 14 14

5,000 *Bass Miss. 7 7 7

11,500 *Bear Expl. 7 5 5%

100 Cn Battle Gld 76 76 76

10 Betty 1st pr 90 90 90

44 Beauchamps 4% 4% 4%

189 Bell Phone. 1484 1484 147

2,821 Bell Telephone 1484 1484 147

59 *Bentall ... 120 120 120

5 Blue Rib. ... 5 5 5

700 *Bettar ... 4% 4% 4%

160 *Biralorne ... 840 840 840

2,200 *Cm Mirette 394 35 35

796 C P R ... 4% 4% 4%

30 Brew & Dis ... 4% 4% 4%

130 Cdn Wine. 5% 5% 5%

1,575 Cdn Wl. Off. ... 100 100 100

11 Cdn Wl. Off. ... 264 264 264

14,426 *Broulan ... 50 50 50

8,180 *Centri Pat. 182 163 180

3,200 *Buffalo Oil ... 8 8 8

450 *Buffalo Am310 285 295 295

1,000 *Buffalo Cn 1% 1% 1%

STOCK EXCHANGE STOCKS

Sales. High. Low. Last.

315 Build Prod. 134 129 134

15 Brinlins St. 84 85 85

450 Cm Simp. 104 104 104

55 Cominco ... 31% 31% 33

55 Canadian ... 102 102 102

15 Crw. N Cl 34 34 34

100 *Cub Air. ... 80 80 80

5,900 *Davies F. 13 124 124

707 Dist Seagr. 25 24% 24%

662 Domme ... 194 19 19%

10 Dom Dom Fdry. 200 160 160

1,065 Dom Fin. 214 204 214

10 Dom Fin. pr 111 111 110

10 Dom St. B. 76 67 67

6 Dom Strs. 3% 3% 3%

25 Dom Tar. ... 5% 5% 5%

332 Dom WI pr. 4% 3% 4%

1,000 *Duquesne. 3 2 3

2,000 *East Crest. 4 4 4

12,800 *E. Malar. 280 245 280

12,225 *Eldorado. 34 34 34

5,000 *Emco. 280 270 280

1,000 *Ensign. 100 98 100

5,000 *Falconb. 250 240 245

645 Fanny Fa. 24% 23% 24%

5,000 *Fidelity Ind. 200 190 190

5,000 *Flem. 100 98 100

5,000 *Fleet Air. 14 14 14

5,000 *Fleet Ind. 14 14 14

5,000 *Fleet Mar. 14 14 14

5,000 *F

wheat surplus, a surplus that is taxing storage facilities, that would depress prices further were it not for their having been pegged at 70 cents a bushel and that is occupying the activities and attention of thousands of farmers who could be more advantageously employed in munitions making. Why these men in the present critical national emergency should have to go on making more of the things of which there are too much already is beyond rational comprehension. How much better balanced would be the economic life of the prairie provinces if some of the very large volume of plant construction were located in the wheat States! The income of the individual farmer would be less dependent on the weather and the price fluctuations of a single commodity. A large share of that economic security that is the goal of most men will have been attained with a consequent removal of the heavy burden of farm relief.

As it is, the farm situation, especially in the prairie provinces, is continuing to grow worse. The Minister of Trade and Commerce, J. A. MacKinnon, has just announced the imposition of a 15-cent processing tax on Canadian wheat consumed in the Dominion. The tax will be part of an amendment to the Wheat Board Act. With domestic consumption placed at 50,000,000 bushels, revenue is expected to approximate \$7,500,000 and will go to help meet the Wheat Board's rapidly mounting deficit.

The tax will also be of aid in maintaining the price peg on wheat which comes to 70 cents for spot or cash No. 1 Northern and 71% cents for futures at Winnipeg for the same grade. Thus, this year as last, farmers are assured a minimum of 70 cents a bushel for their wheat, part of which price (the processing tax) will come directly from the public.

This latter point is subject to some controversy or at least to some difference of opinion. Although admitting that the price of flour will be directly affected by the tax, Mr. MacKinnon thought that the price of bread would not or need not be raised inasmuch as only one cent of the price of a loaf is represented in the cost of flour.

This contention was almost immediately disputed by the Montreal Bakers Association, Montreal bakers threatening a one-cent increase per loaf of bread. The

processing tax appears to be the last straw that broke the camel's back, at least as far as the bakers in Montreal are concerned. The claim that they have been absorbing all sorts of taxes, both provincial and Federal, as well as higher prices for the ingredients of their products for the last several months without having passed them on to the consumer. Montreal is only one of a number of cities in which a rise in the price of bread appears imminent. On the other hand, the Wartime Prices and Trade Board issued a counter-threat that no price rises were justified, and that the board would police the price of bread and take appropriate action where necessary.

That so much fuss has been made over so seemingly trivial a matter is evidence of how far the farm problem can go, how much it is a problem that affects the pockets of every citizen of Canada. It is also illustrative of the situation (as it was) in the United States. Bread, of course, is a staple food, and the advance in price would greatly affect the marginal consumer and the consumption of other less essential goods. It might very well lead to a demand for higher wages to offset the increased cost of living and eventually lead to the good old "vicious spiral of inflation." But the main point in relating this account is to indicate the advisability of industrializing the prairie provinces so as to equilibrate their economics.

TABLE I. NET VALUE OF PRODUCTION IN CANADA IN 1937 (Thousands of dollars)

	Production.	% of Total.
Manufactures	1,195,699	40.0
Agriculture	678,953	22.7
Mining	372,796	12.4
Forestry	284,493	9.5
Construction	176,030	6.0
Electric power	140,964	4.7
Custom and repair	98,485	3.3
Fisheries	34,439	1.1
Trapping	10,477	0.4
Total	2,992,336	100.0

*Excludes duplications. See footnote to Table II.

The accompanying tables (I and II) give a statistical picture of the Canadian economy as it was during the year 1937. Presumably the percentage relationships still hold today. That they will hold in the coming years is doubtful. According to Table I, manufacturing accounted for approximately 40 per cent of the net value of all production during 1937. Agriculture was next with 23 per cent; mining, 12.5 per cent; forestry, 9.5 per cent; con-

struction, 6 per cent, and electric power, 5 per cent. In all, those industries accounted for 95 per cent of the net value of production. At first glance, this seems to be a rather balanced economy, not unduly dependent upon any one industry to maintain the standard of living of the populace. Yet a glance at Table II will show that the largest part of this wealth produced in the relatively prosperous year of 1937 was created in only two provinces. Ontario and Quebec, with 61 per cent of the population, produced 70 per cent of the wealth.

The appearance of economic balance is further found to be misleading when a little more figuring is done. Whereas in the national average agriculture comes to only 23 per cent of the net value of production, in Manitoba it accounts for 52 per cent, in Saskatchewan, 51 per cent, and in Alberta, 67 per cent. No wonder Alberta has gone "social credit."

The rapid industrial expansion that Canada is undergoing at the present time, as a result of the war, affords an unusual opportunity to bring about a more real balance in the Dominion's economic life.

S. L. MILLER.

Dominion Bond Prices and Yields

(Based on opening and bid prices)

	Prices	Yields
Long Term.	Short Term.	Aver.
June 11. 100.11	101.03	102.03
June 12. 100.10	101.03	102.02
June 13. Holiday		
June 14. 100.20	101.16	102.12
June 15. 100.20	101.22	102.39
June 16. 100.20	101.18	102.39
June 17. 100.20	101.13	101.97
June 18. 99.96	101.13	101.97
June 19. 99.96	101.13	101.97
June 20. 99.96	101.13	101.97
June 21. 100.01	101.10	101.98
June 22. 100.01	101.10	101.98
June 23. 99.96	101.10	101.96
June 24. 100.01	101.10	101.98
June 25. 100.01	101.10	101.98
June 26. 99.96	101.10	101.96
June 27. 99.96	101.10	101.95
June 28. 100.01	101.10	101.97
June 29. 100.01	101.10	101.97
July 1. Dominion Day		
July 2. 100.01	101.10	101.97
July 3. 100.01	101.10	101.96
July 4. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 5. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 6. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 7. 100.01	101.10	101.94
July 8. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 9. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 10. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 11. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 12. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 13. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 14. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 15. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 16. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 17. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 18. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 19. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 20. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 21. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 22. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 23. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 24. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 25. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 26. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 27. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 28. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 29. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 30. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 31. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 32. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 33. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 34. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 35. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 36. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 37. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 38. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 39. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 40. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 41. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 42. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 43. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 44. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 45. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 46. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 47. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 48. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 49. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 50. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 51. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 52. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 53. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 54. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 55. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 56. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 57. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 58. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 59. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 60. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 61. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 62. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 63. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 64. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 65. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 66. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 67. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 68. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 69. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 70. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 71. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 72. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 73. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 74. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 75. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 76. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 77. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 78. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 79. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 80. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 81. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 82. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 83. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 84. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 85. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 86. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 87. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 88. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 89. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 90. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 91. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 92. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 93. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 94. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 95. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 96. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 97. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 98. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 99. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 100. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 101. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 102. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 103. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 104. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 105. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 106. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 107. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 108. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 109. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 110. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 111. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 112. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 113. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 114. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 115. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 116. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 117. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 118. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 119. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 120. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 121. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 122. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 123. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 124. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 125. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 126. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 127. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 128. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 129. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 130. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 131. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 132. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 133. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 134. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 135. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 136. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 137. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 138. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 139. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 140. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 141. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 142. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 143. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 144. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 145. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 146. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 147. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 148. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 149. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 150. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 151. 99.99	101.10	101.94
July 152. 99.99	101.10	101.

Financial News of the Week

NET profits of E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. are rising toward a new all-time high record for 1940 despite sharply higher Federal taxes and greatly increased reserves. Earnings of the company in the six months ended June 30 were \$46,854,000, equal to \$3.90 a common share and the highest for any similar period in the company's history. In the first six months of last year profits totaled \$39,872,000, or \$3.21 a common share.

Results achieved in the first half of this year are made more remarkable when it is considered that the company paid Federal taxes of \$10,370,000, almost double the \$5,820,000 paid in the six months ended June 30, 1939. For all 1929—peak year of American business—Federal taxes totaled only \$3,749,000.

In addition to higher taxes, the company set aside from second-quarter earnings a reserve of \$4,000,000 against "unforeseen contingencies." Were it not for higher taxes and increased reserves, du Pont's profits in the first half of this year would have been \$55,404,000, or 40 per cent above a year ago.

It was increased taxes and reserves that caused June quarter profits, after allowance for seasonal variation, to fall away from the all-time peak reached in the first quarter of this year.

For the whole year 1939 the company reported net income of \$93,219,000, or \$7.65 a common share, and the highest in the history of the company. Du Pont is unique among America's leading industrials in that 1939 profits exceeded not only the 1937 high but also the 1929 peak. Sales last year were \$299,000,000—largest in history—and a gain of 27 per cent, as compared with \$235,000,000 in 1938. Sales in the first six months of this year totaled \$163,000,000, an increase of 20 per cent, as compared with \$136,000,000 in the first half of last year.

June-quarter profits of the Hercules Powder Company totaled \$1,550,000, or \$1.08 a common share, the best June quarter in the history of the company. Profits in the preceding period totaled \$1.22 a common share, while in the three months ended June 30, 1939, earnings equaled 80 cents a share.

In the first six months the company cleared \$3,293,000, or \$2.30 a share, as contrasted with \$2,269,000, or \$1.52 a share, in the corresponding months of last year. Sales aggregated \$24,944,000, a new all-time high record and a gain of 37 per cent, as contrasted with \$18,151,000 in the first half of last year.

According to trade reports, strictly war business has played a relatively small part in the recent sales upswing. The major part of the increase reflects increased buying by mines, quarries and construction companies.

Profits of the Mathieson Alkali Works in the June quarter of this year totaled \$463,000, or 51 cents a share, as compared with \$364,000, equal to 39 cents a share, in the preceding quarter, and \$174,000, equal to 16 cents a share, in the June quarter of last year.




For the first six months of this year the company reported net income of \$828,000, or 90 cents a share, as compared with \$336,000, equal to 31 cents a share, in the first half of last year. Current operations are at the highest level since the middle of 1937.

INDUSTRIES

Figures in Parentheses Give Date of Last Previous Item

American Car and Foundry (7-25-40)—The company has received an order from Illinois Central Railroad Company for 500 40-ton cars.

American Cyanamid (6-13-40)—Chemical Construction Company of New York, a division of this company, has started construction



E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc.									
(Thousands)									
Years Ended Dec. 31:	Net Income From Sales.	Income From Operations.	From G.M.	Federal Taxes.	Net Income.	Earned a Com. Sh.	Common Dividends.	Surplus for Year.	
1929.....	\$34,212	\$42,939	\$3,749	\$78,172	\$6.99	\$60,163	\$12,137		
1930.....	21,746	32,937	2,364	55,962	4.52	46,000	3,900		
1931.....	21,109	29,943	2,225	53,190	4.30	44,074	2,926		
1932.....	\$123,000	10,354	12,500	987	26,235	1.81	29,940	d10,234	
1933.....	153,500	24,358	12,500	3,460	38,995	2.93	30,246	2,105	
1934.....	179,394	30,291	15,000	4,818	46,701	3.63	34,253	5,893	
1935.....	219,979	40,717	22,498	6,549	62,085	5.02	42,945	12,583	
1936.....	260,333	52,965	41,004	11,775	89,584	7.53	67,402	15,924	
1937.....	286,043	55,977	36,672	11,210	88,032	7.25	68,951	11,286	
1938.....	235,409	36,795	14,629	5,950	50,191	3.74	35,904	5,479	
1939.....	298,833	67,252	35,000	14,060	93,219	7.65	77,350	7,300	
	Invested Capital.	% Earned on Cap.	Net Property.	Cash or Equivalent.	Inventory.	Working Capital.	Current Ratio.	Surplus.	
1929.....	\$452,694	17.3	\$170,334	\$36,606	\$43,311	\$85,462	4.97	\$144,920	
1930.....	530,381	12.6	190,175	62,516	39,457	113,013	11.25	208,083	
1931.....	531,577	10.0	192,574	68,723	33,564	112,473	12.91	198,993	
1932.....	502,203	5.2	185,831	62,702	28,558	98,506	12.17	178,717	
1933.....	501,277	7.8	182,425	77,849	33,836	115,141	8.87	170,345	
1934.....	510,474	9.1	199,874	61,696	43,670	104,870	6.48	178,729	
1935.....	549,729	11.3	206,011	70,126	44,872	121,449	6.38	196,312	
1936.....	583,691	15.4	221,960	75,816	50,548	122,922	4.80	226,237	
1937.....	652,226	13.5	249,430	104,125	63,473	155,500	5.59	244,772	
1938.....	661,112	7.6	246,651	114,338	51,513	161,505	6.80	256,252	
1939.....	671,235	13.9	251,587	129,683	51,538	162,201	4.42	256,369	
	d Deficit.								

of a new \$11,000,000 plant "somewhere in Ontario" for the production of high explosives for the British Government, which will finance the project.

Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing (6-13-40)—Orders booked, periods ended June 30:

1940..... 1939.

Three months \$27,430,585 \$25,710,826

Six months 47,584,526 45,228,347

Billings, periods ended June 30:

1940..... 1939.

Three months \$25,125,447 \$20,816,593

Six months 43,586,602 38,378,006

Unfilled orders on June 30, 1940, were \$23,618,500; \$17,261,752 on June 30, 1939.

American Locomotive (7-25-40)—Company has received an order from Reading for three 600-horsepower Diesel-electric switching locomotives.

American Tobacco (6-13-40)—Department of Justice filed criminal charges under Sherman Anti-Trust Act in Federal Court, Lexington, Ky., against this company, Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company, R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, P. Lorillard Company, Philip Morris & Co., Ltd., Imperial Tobacco Company of Great Britain & Ireland, Ltd., British-American Tobacco Company, Ltd., and Universal Leaf Tobacco Company, as well as twenty-six other corporations and thirty-three individuals.

Associated Dry Goods (8-24-39)—Directors have declared a dividend of \$1.75 on account of arrears on second preferred stock, leaving arrears of \$32.25 a share.

Atlantic, Gulf & West Indies Steamship Lines—Navy Department has arranged to buy the liner Iroquois from Clyde-Mallory Lines, a subsidiary of this company. Purchase price was not disclosed.

Aviation Corporation (7-25-40)—The company has entered into a contract to purchase for its operating subsidiary, Aviation Manufacturing Corporation, the assets and going business of Republic Aircraft Products Corporation. Payment will be made in Aviation Corporation stock at the rate of one and three-quarter shares for each share of Republic. Transaction is subject to approval by Republic directors and ratification by its stockholders.

Baldwin Locomotive Works (7-4-40)—Company has received an order from Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company for ten type 4-8-4 locomotives. Reading Company has ordered five Diesel-electric switch engines, having total value of around \$350,000.

Bendix Aviation (7-18-40)—The War Department has awarded two contracts, totaling \$489,035, to Eclipse Machine division of this company.

Bethlehem Steel (7-25-40)—Eugene G. Grace, president, has announced that the corporation had made arrangements to sell \$20,000,000 of three-to-ten-year serial debentures. The obligations are dated July 15 and mature serially from July 15, 1943, to July 15, 1950. Maturities will amount to \$2,500,000 each year for the life of the debentures. Interest rates on the issues range from 1% to 2.60 per cent.

The debentures are to be sold privately and, therefore, will not be registered under the Securities Act, Mr. Grace revealed. Bethlehem plans to call for redemption on Aug. 26 a total of \$23,040,000 of its fifteen-year sinking fund convertible debentures due on Oct. 1, 1952, leaving outstanding \$24,000,000 of such debentures. The debentures to be retired, which are to be selected

Continued on Page 163

CORPORATE NET EARNINGS INDUSTRIES

Com. Share Company.	Net Income 1940.	Earnings 1939.
Acme Steel Co.	\$661,149	\$259,969
116 mo.	599,641	3,19
12 mo.	912,374	2,78

Aero Supply Mfg. Co.: 6 mo., June 30. 281,142 48,233 b.66 b.09

Air Associates, Inc.: 9 mo., June 30. 215,735 62,929 h.100 h.49

Air Reduction Co., Inc.: June 30 gr. 1,663,106 1,206,340 h.61 h.47

116 mo., June 30 3,106,094 2,232,565 h.14 h.87

Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.: June 30 gr. 1,639,889 990,145 .92 .66

6 mo., June 30. 2,609,758 1,700,422 1.47 .96

American Chicle Co.: June 30 gr. 1,889,544 1,883,381 h.27 h.23

6 mo., June 30. 1,889,544 1,883,381 h.43 h.31

American Home Products Corp.: 6 mo., June 30. 2,158,109 2,009,181 j.66 2.49

American Ice Co.: 6 mo., June 30. 1371,931 155,586

American Metal Co., Ltd.: June 30 gr. 538,377 520,263 .36 .34

6 mo., June 30. 1,062,063 534,917 .70 .27

12 mo., June 30. 3,521,685 2,138,509 2.65 1.42

LIQUOR NOTICE

NOTICE is hereby given that liquor license #GB 11018 has been issued to the undersigned to sell beer at retail in a store under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law at 1000 Third Avenue, City of New York, County New York for off-premises consumption.

Bloomingdale Bros., Inc.
1000 Third Ave., New York City.

Company.	Net Income 1940.	Com. Share Earnings 1939.	Company.	Net Income 1940.	Com. Share Earnings 1939.	Company.	Net Income 1940.	Com. Share Earnings 1939.	Company.	Net Income 1940.	Com. Share Earnings 1939.	
	1939.	1940.		1939.	1940.		1939.	1940.		1939.	1940.	
American Radiator & Std. Sanitary Corp.:			Catalin Corp.:	116,406	71,494	Dennis Mfg. Co.:	v243,000		General Refractories Co.:	240,223	71,738	
June 30 qr.... 1,096,151	360,469	.10 .03	6 mo., June 30.	53,427	.14 pl.22	6 mo., June 30.			June 30 qr.... 362,477	133,686	.77 .28	
6 mo., June 30. 1,535,905			Chain Belt Co.:	1,186,289	2.44	Detroit Steel Corp.:	95,407	17,943	12 mo., June 30. 1,281,396	209,203	2.72 .44	
American Rolling Mill Co.:			Champion Paper & Fibre Co.:	1,731,937	x446,648	Dixie-Vertex Co.:	12 mo., June 30.	825,007	819,979	General Steel Castings Corp.:	14,062	100,105
June 30 qr.... 1,079,405	875,671	.20 .13	Yr., Apr. 28.		2.24 p5.76	12 mo., June 30.		1.87	June 30 qr.... 72,963	614,790	p.73	
6 mo., June 30. 2,084,598	1,669,150	.37 .23	Checker Cab Mfg. Corp.:	286,844	.182,209	Doebler Die Casting Co.:	56,984	263,128	General Theatres Equipment Corp.:	195,637	182,686	
American Steel Foundries:			June 30 qr.... 177,590	1,163,191	1.64	6 mo., June 30.	1,133,451	2.12 .94	June 30 qr.... 406,318	328,230	h.33 h.55	
6 mo., June 30. 1,066,525	114,342	1.40 .09	Chicago Yellow Cab:	23,509	6,826	Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc.:	May 31 qr.... 1,583,979	625,239	Gillette Safety Razor Co.:	6 mo., June 30. 1,333,451	1,616,907	
American Stove Co.:			June 30 qr.... 100,912	52,872	.34 .18	May 31 gr.... 3,388,857	h.2.64 h.1.10	6 mo., June 30. 1,333,451	1,616,907	.29 .43		
June 30 qr.... 397,520	596,311	.73 1.11	Chicago Railway Equipment:	7,612	23,224	June 30 qr.... 23,126,507	30,796,159	Goodrich, B. F. Co.:	6 mo., June 30. 1,362,691	3,122,728		
6 mo., June 30. 506,708	700,641	.94 1.30	June 30 qr.... 23,224	p.0.8	Chrysler Corp.:	June 30 qr.... 23,126,507	30,796,159	Greenfield Tap & Die Corp.:	6 mo., June 30. 214,261	57,702		
American Type Founders, Inc.:			Yr., Apr. 28.		2.24 p5.76	Chrysler Corp.:	June 30 qr.... 23,126,507	30,796,159	Hamilton Watch Co.:	June 30 qr.... 127,039	80,479	
June 30 qr.... 148,175	10,476		Clark Equipment Co.:	265,365	678,052	Dochier Die Casting Co.:	12 mo., June 30.	813,979	Hammer Watch Co.:	June 30 qr.... 127,039	80,479	
Arusel Corp.:			6 mo., June 30.	921,252	300,191	Doebler Die Casting Co.:	6 mo., June 30.	263,128	Hercules Powder Co.:	6 mo., June 30. 1,000,207	205,070	
6 mo., June 30. 1,419,997	1,677,814		3.60	1.83	Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc.:	May 31 qr.... 1,583,979	625,239	Heywood-Wakefield Co.:	6 mo., June 30. 75,005	125,519		
Atlas Powder Co.:			6 mo., June 30.	100,912	52,872	May 31 gr.... 3,388,857	h.2.64 h.1.10	Hinde & Dauch Co.:	6 mo., June 30. 284,183	285,226		
June 30 qr.... 379,822	229,206	1.17 .58	Chicago Railway Equipment:	7,612	23,224	June 30 qr.... 23,126,507	30,796,159	Houdaille-Hershey Corp.:	6 mo., June 30. 482,319	323,933		
6 mo., June 30. 744,518	449,913	2.29 1.12	June 30 qr.... 23,224	p.0.8	Conde Nast Publications Inc.:	6 mo., June 30. 89,794	156,551	Fairbanks, Morse & Co.:	June 30 qr.... 711,065	356,871		
Atlas Tack Corp.:			Clark Equipment Co.:	265,365	678,052	Conde Nast Publications Inc.:	6 mo., June 30. 89,794	156,551	Fairbanks, Morse & Co.:	June 30 qr.... 711,065	b.77 b.31	
6 mo., June 30. 53,186	46,384	.56 .49	6 mo., June 30.	921,252	300,191	Consolidated Chemical Industries, Inc.:	6 mo., June 30. 1,236,665	1,266,171	Fansteel Metallurgical Corp.:	6 mo., June 30. 1,472,711	784,010	
Aviation Corp.:			3.60	1.83	Compressed Industrial Gases, Inc.:	June 30 qr.... 104,557	69,447	Federal Bake Shops, Inc.:	6 mo., June 30. 106,560	89,914		
May 31 qr.... 193,377			40	.26	June 30 qr.... 104,557	69,447	Federal-Mogul Corp.:	6 mo., June 30. 361,668	286,005			
6 mo., May 31. 228,525	1,000,207		.44	6 mo., June 30.	213,581	116,116	Federal-Mogul Corp.:	6 mo., June 30. 361,668	286,005			
Babcock & Wilcox Co.:			6 mo., June 30.	100,912	52,872	1.65	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
6 mo., June 30. 1,474,905	636,620	2.19	6 mo., June 30.	100,912	52,872	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20				
Baldwin Locomotive Works:			6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
12 mo., June 30. 3,822,927	3,07 .61		12 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.:			12 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
6 mo., June 30. 767,284	554,743	1.54 1.05	12 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
Bayuk Cigars, Inc.:			12 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
**June 30 qr.... 553,678	446,604	1.37 1.07	6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
6 mo., June 30. 557,753	734,580	2.36 1.75	6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
Belden Mfg. Co.:			6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
6 mo., June 30. 167,324	166,639	.69 .69	6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
Bethlehem Steel Corp.:			6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
June 30 qr.... 10,807,318	3,822,927	3.07 .61	6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
12 mo., June 30. 30,21,688,457	6,231,968	6.09 .78	6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
Beyer Roller Bearing Co.:			6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
6 mo., June 30. 669,310	428,336	2.23 1.42	6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
Bridgeport Brass Co.:			6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
June 30 qr.... 144,793	60,681	h.15 h.06	6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
6 mo., June 30. 506,167	67,940	h.04 h.07	6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co.:			6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
June 30 qr.... 420,487	239,632	h.87 h.45	6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
6 mo., June 30. 538,714	374,831	h.05 h.67	6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
Budd (Edward G.) Mfg. Co.:			6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
June 30 qr.... 664,819	173,544	.34 .04	6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
6 mo., June 30. 1,006,352	274,933	.48 .04	6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
Budd Wheel Co.:			6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
June 30 qr.... 223,050	140,768	.22 .14	6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
6 mo., June 30. 483,245	276,274	.48 .27	6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
Butler Bros.:			6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
6 mo., June 30. 419,180	314,675		6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
Campbell, Wyatt & Cannon Fdry. Co.:			6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
6 mo., June 30. 369,233	318,968	1.07	6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
Castle & Co., A. M.:			6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
June 30 qr.... 92,319	45,063	.38 .19	6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
6 mo., June 30. 192,518	80,964	.80 .34	6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
Central Foundry Co.:			6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
June 30 qr.... 53,151	43,864	.07 .06	6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
6 mo., June 30. 35,167	11,136	.04 .01	6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
Chase & Co.:			6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
Christie & Co., A. M.:			6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
June 30 qr.... 22,319	12,100	.38 .19	6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
6 mo., June 30. 192,518	80,964	.80 .34	6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
Churchill Corp.:			6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
6 mo., June 30. 35,167	11,136	.04 .01	6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
Clayton & Lain Co.:			6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
June 30 qr.... 17,100	8,125	.25 .15	6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June 30.	156,077	1.20			
6 mo., June 30. 17,100	8,125	.25 .15	6 mo., June 30.	1,734,344	11,968,666	1.55	6 mo., June					

Company.	Net Income 1940.	Com. Share Earnings. 1939.	1940.	1939.
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Island Creek Coal Co.	425,626	132,568	.65	.16
6 mo., June 30.	950,776	432,011	1.47	.60

Jackson Co., Byron	94,185	100,156	.25	.26
6 mo., June 30.	241,318	219,227	.64	.57

Jones & Laughlin Steel:	2,141,645	1,711,287	1.93	...
June 30 qr.	1,000,000	800,000	1.93	...

Kalamazoo Stove & Furnace Co.	6 mo., June 30.	65,484	112,922	.22	...
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Kingston Products Corp.	6 mo., June 30.	53,836	46,23003
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Kinney, G. R. Co., Inc.	6 mo., June 30.	25,530	67,238	r.40	r.08
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Lambert Co.	June 30 qr.	100,432	219,214	.13	.29
6 mo., June 30.	539,572	652,657	.72	.87	

Lane Bryant, Inc.	Yr., May 31.	218,228	133,156	1.24	...
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Lehigh Coal & Navigation:	12 mo., June 30.	138,811	149,008	.07	.08
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Lehigh Valley Coal Corp.	June 30 qr.	119,417	183,904	p.31	...
6 mo., June 30.	71,924	117,147	p.31	...	

Life Savers Corp.	12 mo., June 30.	1,302,242	1,797,965
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Lion Oil Refining Co.	June 30 qr.	207,780	226,997	.48	.52
6 mo., June 30.	378,876	215,178	.87	.49	

Lindsay Light & Chemical Co.	6 mo., June 30.	57,376	22,936	.81	.25
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Loew's, Inc.	40 wks., June 6	7,996,394	8,173,060	4.39	4.62
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Lone Star Cement Corp.	June 30 qr.	318,005	222,661	h.85	h.96
6 mo., June 30.	1,371,610	1,509,719	h.42	h.56	

Long-Bell Lumber Corp.	June 30 qr.	13,332	11,244
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Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co.	6 mo., June 30.	441,308	382,640	h.66	h.54
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Lynch Corp.	6 mo., June 30.	216,248	228,449	1.53	1.62
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Marchant Calculating Machine Co.	6 mo., June 30.	407,767	361,451	1.79	1.56
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Margay Oil Corp.	June 30 qr.	50,569	87,180
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Martin, Glenn L. Co.	June 30 qr.	2,128,820	285,127	1.95	.26
6 mo., June 30.	4,291,490	967,624	3.92	.88	

Master Electric Co.	June 30 qr.	242,685	145,191	h.10	h.70
6 mo., June 30.	450,286	240,468	h.86	h.14	

McIntyre Porcupine Mines, Ltd.	June 30 qr.	972,831	942,991	1.22	1.18
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Mengel Co.	June 30 qr.	17,721	180,441	r.27	...
12 mo., June 30.	50,902	175,006	r.78	...	

Midvale Co.	12 mo., June 30.	2,069,500	1,423,000	10.34	7.11
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Mid-West Abrasive Co.	6 mo., June 30.	40,407	1,831	.13	.01
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Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.	June 30 qr.	1316,112	287,777	.46	.41
6 mo., June 30.	1603,921	355,066	.87	.47	

Monsanto Chemical Co.	June 30 qr.	1,465,889	918,901	1.07	.64
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Muskegon Motor Specialties Co.	6 mo., June 30.	126,743	111,137	a.21	a.85
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Munsingwear, Inc.	6 mo., June 30.	117,655	130,248
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National Cash Register Co.	June 30 qr.	618,960	704,344	.38	.43
6 mo., June 30.	1,099,831	1,188,369	.67	.73	

National Cylinder Gas:	6 mo., June 30.	526,673	394,941	.56	.42
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National Distillers Products:	June 30 qr.	1,352,473	737,669	.66	.36
6 mo., June 30.	2,431,219	2,110,897	1.19	1.03	

National Oil Products:	6 mo., June 30.	376,498	308,242	2.09	1.71
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National Gypsum Co.:	**June 30 qr.	517,391	506,507	.35	.35
6 mo., June 30.	607,636	696,705	.37	.44	

National Oil Products:	6 mo., June 30.	376,498	308,242	2.09	1.71
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Nash-Kelvinator Corp.	June 30 qr.	901,939	108,264	.21	.02

NOTE: THE ANNALIST uses for these pages the following standing footnote: "Subject to revision. All other footnotes appear immediately below each table. Latest revised data given for previous week or month, and year."

Business Statistics

NOTE: THE ANNALIST uses for these pages the following standing footnote: "Subject to revision. All other footnotes appear immediately below each table. Latest revised data given for previous week or month, and year."

RATE OF OPERATIONS IN THE STEEL INDUSTRY											
As Estimated by											
Week Ended: U. S. Dow-Jones Week Beginning: Iron & Steel.											
1939. Steel. Indep. Total.	7.55%	63% 60	July 31.	59.3	Aug. 5.	60	Aug. 1.	60	59		
Aug. 10.	7.55%	63% 60	July 31.	59.3	Aug. 5.	60	Aug. 1.	60	59		
June 10.	84%	82	83	June 3.	80.3	June 8.	81%	81	June 4.	80%	81
June 17.	87%	84	85	June 15.	84%	June 22.	86	June 18.	85%	85	
June 24.	89%	86	87	June 17.	87%	June 22.	88	June 18.	87%	88	
July 1.	90%	87	88	June 24.	86%	June 29.	89	June 27.	87%	87	
July 8.	71%	72	72	July 1.	74.1	July 6.	75	July 2.	75	74	
July 15.	90%	85	87	July 8.	74.4	July 13.	88	July 9.	87%	87	
July 22.	91%	84	87	July 15.	96.8	July 20.	88	July 16.	87%	87	
July 29.	July 22.	88.2	July 27.	89%	July 23.	89	88	
Aug. 5.	July 29.	90.4	Aug. 3.	90%	July 30.	90%	90	

OIL REFINERY ACTIVITY AND STOCKS (18)									
(Estimated for entire industry; thousands of barrels. P. C. of capacity, reporting companies only. Gasoline production, including cracked, straight run and natural blended. Petroleum stocks estimated from Bureau of Mines data. Gasoline stocks include both finished and unfinished gasoline.)									
Crude Runs to Still. Average P. C. of Daily Capacity Operated.									
Week Ended:	Total.	Crude Production.	Gasoline Petroleum.	Stocks.					
1939.	3,460	85.0	11,433	268,513	77,887	146,953			
July 29.	3,625	85.3	11,672	262,059	95,142	138,076			
July 6.	3,575	82.4	11,469	261,732	93,275	140,073			
July 13.	3,565	82.3	11,388	261,494	92,372	141,931			
July 20.	3,540	81.6	11,378	261,596	91,789	143,368			
July 27.	3,555	82.1	11,474	261,250	90,173	144,905			

PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN FREIGHT CAR LOADINGS WEEKLY									
(Percentage changes from corresponding week of previous year)									
Week Ended:	Sou.	Pac.	Un.						
1939.	N.Y.C. Penn. N. H. N. A.W. B&Q. C.R.O. Atch. Pac.								
May 25.	+12.4	+16.3	+0.6	+21.9	+15.0	+12.4	+0.6	+0.3	+4.8
June 1.	+22.1	+96.6	+4.1	+23.9	+24.8	+17.7	+0.6	+2.6	+1.5
June 8.	+19.0	+18.9	+1.7	+12.6	+19.9	+17.2	+1.6	+6.4	+2.3
June 15.	+20.4	+19.7	+1.7	+12.6	+19.9	+17.1	+1.6	+5.8	+0.8
June 22.	+26.4	+22.7	+3.4	+11.6	+21.9	+12.4	+2.7	+8.8	+0.7
June 29.	+18.3	+17.8	+1.9	+12.1	+17.1	+11.2	+0.6	+10.0	+2.7
July 6.	+21.8	+23.9	+3.2	+15.0	+20.4	+11.8	+5.5	+10.4	+8.2
July 13.	+12.3	+19.1	+0.7	+12.8	+8.8	+7.7	+1.6	+5.8	+2.4
July 20.	+13.5	+22.5	+3.5	+7.0	+13.5	+0.4	+8.0	+1.0	+0.5
July 27.	+19.8	+18.8	+2.2	+6.1	+8.1	+1.6	+3.1	+1.0	+3.7

FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES WEEKLY									
(Demand rates where noted; all others, cable. Belgium: 1 belga=5 Belgian francs. France, Switzerland, Mexico: No official par; par shown is old par)									
Par. Country and Unit.	July 27, 1940.	High.	Low.	July 20, 1940.	High.	Low.	July 29, 1939.	High.	Low.
.0426 Finland (markka)	0.0205	0.0205	0.0205	0.0205	0.0207	0.0207			
.0220 Greece (drachma)	0.0058	0.0058	0.0058	0.0058	0.0058	0.0058			
.2961 Hungary (pengo)	1.938	1.938	1.938	1.938	1.970	1.970			
.0526 Italy (lira)	0.0505	0.0505	0.0505	0.0505	0.0526	0.0526			
.0749 Portugal (escudo) de-									
mand	0.032	0.038	0.032	0.0376	0.0427	0.0427			
.0101 Rumania (leu)	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.0572	0.0572			
.4537 Sweden (krona)	2.390	2.383	2.390	2.387	2.413	2.412			
.2367 Switzerland (franc)	2.275	2.271	2.274	2.267	2.258	2.256			
8.2397 United Kingdom (pound)	3.91	3.75	3.96	3.71	4.684	4.681			
.0298 Yugoslavia (dinar)	0.0235	0.0235	0.0235	0.0235	0.0231	0.0231			
1.6031 Canada (dollar) de-									
mand	0.887	0.8687	0.8882	0.8725	1.0000	0.9900			
.5440 Mexico (peso) dem'd.	2.050	2.050	2.050	2.035	1.760	1.730			
..... Argentina (paper peso) free market	2.250	2.200	2.275	2.180	2.320	2.320			
.0606 Brazil (minreis) free market	0.0515	0.0515	0.0515	0.0515	0.0510	0.0510			
Chile (peso official)	0.0516	0.0516	0.0516	0.0516	0.0519	0.0519			
.5714 Colombia (gold peso)	5.800	5.800	5.800	5.800	5.800	5.800			
.4740 Peru (sol)	1.600	1.600	1.600	1.600	1.885	1.885			
.6533 Uruguay (gold peso) free market	3.700	3.650	3.750	3.650	3.675	3.675			
China: Hong Kong (silver dollar) demand	2.395	2.376	2.431	2.370	2.865	2.861			
Shanghai (silver dollar) demand	0.0628	0.0618	0.0637	0.0622	0.0685	0.0620			
.6180 India (rupee) demand	3.027	3.027	3.027	3.027	3.492	3.489			
.8440 Japan (yen) demand	2.243	2.243	2.243	2.243	2.272	2.272			
.5000 Philippines (peso)	4.978	4.978	4.978	4.978	4.982	4.979			
.9613 Straits Settlements (Straits dollar)	4.751	4.750	4.751	4.751	4.370	5.495			
8.2397 Australia (pound)	3.085	3.065	3.12	3.01	3.745	3.747			
8.2397 Un. S. Africa (pound)	3.85	3.81	3.89	3.76	4.675	4.676			

FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES DAILY									
(Cable transfer rates, except as noted; for currency units see Foreign Exchange Rates Weekly)									
United Kingdom: High	\$3.87%	\$3.88%	\$3.89	\$3.89	\$3.82%	\$3.91			
Low	3.84	3.85%	3.83	3.81	3.75	3.81			
Last	3.84	3.86	3.85	3.85	3.82	3.82			
Italy: High0505	.0505	.0505	.0505	.0505	.0505			
Low0505	.0505	.0505	.0505	.0505	.0505			
Last0505	.0505	.0505	.0505	.0505	.0505			
Sweden: High	2.390	2.390	2.390	2.390	2.389	2.389			
Low	2.389	2.389	2.389	2.389	2.389	2.388			
Last	2.390	2.390	2.390	2.390	2.390	2.389			
Canada, demand rate: High8794	.8750	.8650	.8662	.8675	.8687			
Low8750	.8687	.8725	.8838	.8850	.8862			
Last8775	.8750	.8844	.8866	.8866	.8875			
Japan, closing	2.348	2.348	2.348	2.348	2.348	2.348			
Argentina, closing, free mkt.2210	.2200	.2225	.2230	.2250	.2220			

COMMERCIAL FAILURES WEEKLY (11)									
Trade Groups. July 25, 1940.	1040.	1040.	1040.	1040.	1040.	1040.	1040.	1040.	1040.
Manufacturing	44	57	59	57	59	57	59	57	59
Wholesale	30	32	28	32	30	32	30	32</	

Stock and Bond Market Averages and Volume of Trading

The Annalist Weighted Averages of Group Leaders

	July 25			July 26			July 27			Cal. Wks. Range			July 29			July 30			July 31			
	High.	Low.	Last.	High.	Low.	Last.	High.	Low.	Last.	High.	Low.	Range	High.	Low.	Last.	High.	Low.	Last.	High.	Low.	Last.	
97 Stocks	38.0	37.6	37.9	38.4	37.9	38.1	38.3	38.1	38.2	38.3	37.6	38.6	38.6	39.5	40.0	39.3	39.5	39.6	39.3	39.5	39.5	
74 Industrials	126.5	125.3	126.4	127.4	126.2	126.7	127.2	126.7	127.1	127.4	125.3	128.3	128.1	131.6	132.9	130.8	131.5	132.9	130.8	131.5	131.5	
4 Steels	31.5	31.0	31.5	31.8	31.5	31.8	31.6	31.8	31.8	31.8	31.0	32.3	32.3	33.2	33.2	33.2	32.7	32.7	32.7	32.7	32.7	32.7
4 Motors	58.1	57.3	58.1	59.3	58.1	58.6	58.6	58.6	58.6	59.3	57.3	60.5	60.5	60.3	62.2	62.2	61.5	61.5	61.5	61.5	61.5	61.5
5 Motor accessories	32.8	32.5	32.8	32.5	32.2	33.3	33.6	33.3	33.6	33.6	32.4	33.8	33.8	34.4	34.4	34.4	35.0	34.4	34.4	34.6	34.6	34.6
5 Aircrafts	33.8	33.3	33.6	33.6	33.9	34.4	34.4	34.1	34.4	34.4	33.3	34.4	34.4	34.3	34.3	34.3	35.7	34.3	34.3	35.7	35.7	35.7
3 Building	27.3	27.0	27.3	27.0	26.9	27.3	27.0	26.9	27.0	27.0	26.8	27.8	27.3	27.3	27.3	27.3	27.3	27.3	27.3	27.3	27.3	27.3
4 Chemicals	11.7	11.1	11.7	11.6	11.7	11.0	11.7	11.0	11.7	11.7	11.0	11.7	11.7	11.7	12.0	12.0	12.1	12.1	12.1	12.1	12.1	
4 Non-ferrous metals	31.5	31.1	31.5	32.1	31.5	31.9	32.3	32.1	32.3	32.3	31.1	32.2	32.2	34.6	34.6	35.3	34.4	34.6	34.6	34.6	34.6	
4 Foods	31.3	31.0	31.0	31.2	30.7	31.1	30.9	31.0	31.0	31.8	30.7	31.3	31.3	31.6	31.6	31.7	31.3	31.5	31.5	31.5	31.5	
3 Tobaccos	65.9	65.7	65.7	65.9	65.4	65.4	65.7	65.5	65.7	65.5	65.3	65.5	65.5	66.2	66.2	66.4	66.4	66.4	66.4	66.4	66.4	
3 Sugars	17.9	17.8	17.8	17.8	17.8	17.8	17.8	17.8	17.8	18.5	17.8	17.8	18.5	18.3	18.3	18.3	18.3	18.3	18.3	18.3	18.3	
3 Electrical equipments	49.5	48.8	49.5	50.3	49.5	49.9	49.9	49.5	49.5	50.3	48.8	50.7	50.3	51.8	51.8	52.2	51.4	51.8	51.8	51.8	51.8	
3 Farm equipments	36.0	35.7	36.0	36.0	36.0	36.0	36.3	36.3	36.3	36.3	35.7	35.7	35.7	37.4	37.4	38.2	37.7	37.9	37.9	37.9	37.9	
4 Office equipments	13.0	12.8	12.8	13.2	13.1	13.1	13.2	13.0	13.0	13.2	12.8	13.0	13.0	13.2	13.2	13.4	13.3	13.3	13.3	13.3	13.3	
4 Railroad equipments	19.1	19.0	19.1	19.8	19.5	19.8	20.0	19.8	20.0	20.0	19.8	20.1	20.1	20.1	21.1	21.1	21.3	20.8	21.0	21.0	21.0	
4 Amusement	10.8	10.7	10.8	10.9	10.7	10.8	10.8	10.8	10.8	11.0	10.7	11.0	11.0	11.5	11.5	11.6	11.1	11.1	11.1	11.1	11.1	
5 Merchandise	44.7	44.5	44.5	44.9	44.6	44.8	45.0	44.9	45.0	45.0	44.5	45.0	44.8	45.0	45.9	45.9	45.9	46.0	46.0	46.0	46.0	
3 Rubber and tires	22.4	22.0	22.4	22.4	22.4	22.4	22.4	22.4	22.4	23.4	22.0	22.7	22.7	24.0	24.0	24.0	24.0	24.0	24.0	24.0	24.0	
2 Liquor	18.2	18.0	18.2	18.0	18.0	18.2	18.2	18.2	18.2	18.2	17.5	18.6	18.7	19.1	19.1	18.6	18.7	18.8	18.8	18.8	18.8	
4 Standard Oils	18.8	18.5	18.7	18.8	18.6	18.7	18.6	18.7	18.7	18.7	18.5	18.7	18.7	19.0	19.0	19.1	19.1	19.1	19.1	19.1	19.1	
4 Independent oils	38.9	38.5	38.9	39.4	38.9	39.2	39.2	39.1	39.2	39.4	38.5	39.2	39.2	39.5	39.5	39.8	39.8	39.8	39.8	39.8	39.8	
8 Oils	57.7	57.0	57.6	58.2	57.5	57.9	57.9	57.7	57.9	58.2	57.0	57.9	57.9	58.5	58.5	58.6	58.6	58.6	58.6	58.6	58.6	
5 Air transports	21.5	21.1	21.4	21.8	21.4	21.4	21.6	21.4	21.5	21.8	21.1	22.0	21.5	22.8	22.8	23.1	22.4	22.5	22.5	22.5	22.5	
8 Utilities	16.9	16.6	16.9	17.3	16.7	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.3	16.6	17.2	17.0	18.0	18.1	17.8	17.8	17.8	17.8	17.8	17.8	
	21.5	21.1	21.4	21.8	21.4	21.4	21.6	21.4	21.5	21.8	21.1	22.0	21.5	22.8	22.8	23.1	22.4	22.5	22.5	22.5	22.5	

The New York Times Stock Market Averages

MONTHLY HIGH, LOW AND LAST

	25 Rails			25 Industrials			50 Stocks		
	High.	Low.	Last.	High.	Low.	Last.	High.	Low.	Last.
1939.	26.35	20.97	22.62	192.03	171.15	178.87	109.94	96.06	100.74
January	24.90	22.27	24.64	183.35	176.66	182.38	104.12	99.52	103.51
February	25.69	19.88	20.02	189.43	184.30	164.87	107.51	92.44	92.44
March	21.40	18.03	19.68	188.53	151.56	163.56	94.96	84.79	91.62
April	21.71	19.49	21.61	174.73	161.66	173.80	98.00	93.63	97.70
May	21.71	19.29	19.51	177.93	165.21	167.14	99.75	92.25	93.32
June	22.87	19.49	21.98	184.81	167.58	181.77	103.84	93.54	101.87
July	22.66	19.75	19.67	186.21	167.47	173.24	104.43	93.11	96.45
August	27.84	18.76	21.23	202.90	166.58	198.34	114.27	92.67	112.73
September	26.88	21.51	22.52	199.66	161.14	185.31	105.18	103.83	110.51
October	26.88	21.51	22.52	199.66	161.14	185.31	105.18	103.83	110.51
November	25.97	23.67	23.79	195.80	168.05	188.60	105.86	106.34	106.34
December	24.35	23.02	23.88	196.65	166.45	186.45	105.35	106.25	110.00

	25 Rails			25 Industrials			50 Stocks		
	High.	Low.	Last.	High.	Low.	Last.	High.	Low.	Last.
1940.	24.73	22.67	22.75	184.76	188.20	180.73	109.22	105.40	107.24
January	26.68	22.67	22.75	184.76	188.20	180.73	109.22	105.40	107.24
February	25.69	22.50	22.88	184.76	188.20	180.73	109.22	105.40	107.24
March	23.91	22.50	22.88	184.76	188.20	180.73	109.22	105.40	107.24
April	23.99	22.50	22.88	184.76	188.20	180.73	109.22	105.40	107.24
May	23.99	22.50	22.88	184.76	188.20	180.73	109.22	105.40	107.24
June	23.99	22.50	22.88	184.76	188.20	180.73	109.22	105.40	107.24
July	23.99	22.50	22.88	184.76	188.20	180.73	109.22	105.40	107.24

	25 Rails			25 Industrials			50 Stocks		
	High.	Low.	Last.	High.	Low.	Last.	High.	Low.	Last.

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Stock Transactions—New York

For Week Ended Saturday, July 27.

Bid and Asked Quotations on July 27 for Issues Not Traded In

1938	High	Low	High	Low	Date	Stocks and Ticker Abbreviations*	Shares Listed (1000s)	Last Dividend Paid	Per Share	Last Dividend Rate Paid		Stocks and Ticker Abbreviations**	Last Dividend Rate Paid	Per Share	Last Dividend Rate Paid	Per Share	Stocks and Ticker Abbreviations***	Last Dividend Rate Paid	Per Share			
										High	Low											
61	304	116	53	24	190	Abbott Laboratories	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Abbott Lab. & Co., Inc.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Abbott Lab. & Co., Inc.	1,450	.62
1234	116	120	147	2	241	Abbot, A. S. & P. Co.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Abbot, A. S. & P. Co.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Abbot, A. S. & P. Co.	1,450	.62
45	316	109	331	4	241	Abbot, A. S. & P. Co.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Abbot, A. S. & P. Co.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Abbot, A. S. & P. Co.	1,450	.62
52	867	311	622	4	9	Acme Steel Co.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Acme Steel Co.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Acme Steel Co.	1,450	.62
121	124	118	116	5	1-3	Adams Express Co.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Adams Express Co.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Adams Express Co.	1,450	.62
268	126	128	287	5	1-3	Adams Express Co.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Adams Express Co.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Adams Express Co.	1,450	.62
307	465	126	126	5	1-3	Addresso-Multifil \$10.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Addresso-Multifil \$10.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Addresso-Multifil \$10.	1,450	.62
134	144	116	126	5	1-3	Albion Industries, Inc.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Albion Industries, Inc.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Albion Industries, Inc.	1,450	.62
197	124	120	120	5	1-3	Allied Chemical Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Allied Chemical Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Allied Chemical Corp.	1,450	.62
125	85	130	117	7	1-8	Almatis, Inc.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almatis, Inc.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almatis, Inc.	1,450	.62
135	86	116	94	7	1-7	Almenning Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almenning Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almenning Corp.	1,450	.62
701	38	71	54	7	1-7	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
135	114	140	89	7	1-3	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	78	69	52	7	1-3	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	85	72	60	7	1-3	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	8	47	16	75	4-5	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	10	47	16	75	4-5	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	10	47	16	75	4-5	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	10	47	16	75	4-5	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	10	47	16	75	4-5	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	10	47	16	75	4-5	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	10	47	16	75	4-5	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	10	47	16	75	4-5	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	10	47	16	75	4-5	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	10	47	16	75	4-5	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	10	47	16	75	4-5	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	10	47	16	75	4-5	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	10	47	16	75	4-5	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	10	47	16	75	4-5	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	10	47	16	75	4-5	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	10	47	16	75	4-5	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	10	47	16	75	4-5	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	10	47	16	75	4-5	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	10	47	16	75	4-5	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	10	47	16	75	4-5	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	10	47	16	75	4-5	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	10	47	16	75	4-5	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	10	47	16	75	4-5	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	10	47	16	75	4-5	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	10	47	16	75	4-5	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	10	47	16	75	4-5	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	10	47	16	75	4-5	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62
226	10	47	16	75	4-5	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.	1,450	.62	.62	1.40	1.40	1.40	Almetco Corp.		

Stock Transaction—New York Stock Exchange—Continued

For Calendar Week Ended—

Stock Transactions—New York Stock Exchange—Continued

Four Calendar Week Ended—

Saturday, July 27

Stock Transaction—New York Stock Exchange—Continued

earnings per share as reported by Standard Statistics Company or New York:

Blank means figures not available.	f -Not computed, as results are before depreciation and depletion.
Full face -1 to 12-Number of months covered by latest interim report.	e -Earnings for 1938 and 1937 or fiscal years ended through Jan. 31, 1939.
a -On all classes of company only.	g -Initial dividend.
b -Parent company only.	d -Deficit.

Stock Transactions—New York Stock Exchange—Continued

For Calendar Week Ended—

United States Government Securities															
RECENT TREND								AVERAGE PRICES ON OUTSTANDING SECURITIES							
Stocks and Bonds				Bonds				Stocks and Bonds				Bonds			
Year	High	Low	Range	High	Low	Range	Date	High	Low	Range	High	Low	Date	High	Low
1938	1.88	1.88	—	1.80	1.78	—	July 22	1.98	1.97	—	1.98	1.97	July 22	1.98	1.97
1939	2.00	1.98	—	1.98	1.96	—	July 22	2.00	1.98	—	2.00	1.98	July 22	2.00	1.98
1940	2.12	2.08	—	2.08	2.04	—	July 22	2.12	2.08	—	2.12	2.08	July 22	2.12	2.08
1941	2.18	2.14	—	2.14	2.10	—	July 22	2.18	2.14	—	2.18	2.14	July 22	2.18	2.14
1942	2.20	2.16	—	2.16	2.12	—	July 22	2.20	2.16	—	2.20	2.16	July 22	2.20	2.16
1943	2.22	2.18	—	2.18	2.14	—	July 22	2.22	2.18	—	2.22	2.18	July 22	2.22	2.18
1944	2.24	2.20	—	2.20	2.16	—	July 22	2.24	2.20	—	2.24	2.20	July 22	2.24	2.20
1945	2.26	2.22	—	2.22	2.18	—	July 22	2.26	2.22	—	2.26	2.22	July 22	2.26	2.22
1946	2.28	2.24	—	2.24	2.20	—	July 22	2.28	2.24	—	2.28	2.24	July 22	2.28	2.24
1947	2.30	2.26	—	2.26	2.22	—	July 22	2.30	2.26	—	2.30	2.26	July 22	2.30	2.26
1948	2.32	2.28	—	2.28	2.24	—	July 22	2.32	2.28	—	2.32	2.28	July 22	2.32	2.28
1949	2.34	2.30	—	2.30	2.26	—	July 22	2.34	2.30	—	2.34	2.30	July 22	2.34	2.30
1950	2.36	2.32	—	2.32	2.28	—	July 22	2.36	2.32	—	2.36	2.32	July 22	2.36	2.32
1951	2.38	2.34	—	2.34	2.30	—	July 22	2.38	2.34	—	2.38	2.34	July 22	2.38	2.34
1952	2.40	2.36	—	2.36	2.32	—	July 22	2.40	2.36	—	2.40	2.36	July 22	2.40	2.36
1953	2.42	2.38	—	2.38	2.34	—	July 22	2.42	2.38	—	2.42	2.38	July 22	2.42	2.38
1954	2.44	2.40	—	2.40	2.36	—	July 22	2.44	2.40	—	2.44	2.40	July 22	2.44	2.40
1955	2.46	2.42	—	2.42	2.38	—	July 22	2.46	2.42	—	2.46	2.42	July 22	2.46	2.42
1956	2.48	2.44	—	2.44	2.40	—	July 22	2.48	2.44	—	2.48	2.44	July 22	2.48	2.44
1957	2.50	2.46	—	2.46	2.42	—	July 22	2.50	2.46	—	2.50	2.46	July 22	2.50	2.46
1958	2.52	2.48	—	2.48	2.44	—	July 22	2.52	2.48	—	2.52	2.48	July 22	2.52	2.48
1959	2.54	2.50	—	2.50	2.46	—	July 22	2.54	2.50	—	2.54	2.50	July 22	2.54	2.50
1960	2.56	2.52	—	2.52	2.48	—	July 22	2.56	2.52	—	2.56	2.52	July 22	2.56	2.52
1961	2.58	2.54	—	2.54	2.50	—	July 22	2.58	2.54	—	2.58	2.54	July 22	2.58	2.54
1962	2.60	2.56	—	2.56	2.52	—	July 22	2.60	2.56	—	2.60	2.56	July 22	2.60	2.56
1963	2.62	2.58	—	2.58	2.54	—	July 22	2.62	2.58	—	2.62	2.58	July 22	2.62	2.58
1964	2.64	2.60	—	2.60	2.56	—	July 22	2.64	2.60	—	2.64	2.60	July 22	2.64	2.60
1965	2.66	2.62	—	2.62	2.58	—	July 22	2.66	2.62	—	2.66	2.62	July 22	2.66	2.62
1966	2.68	2.64	—	2.64	2.60	—	July 22	2.68	2.64	—	2.68	2.64	July 22	2.68	2.64
1967	2.70	2.66	—	2.66	2.62	—	July 22	2.70	2.66	—	2.70	2.66	July 22	2.70	2.66
1968	2.72	2.68	—	2.68	2.64	—	July 22	2.72	2.68	—	2.72	2.68	July 22	2.72	2.68
1969	2.74	2.70	—	2.70	2.66	—	July 22	2.74	2.70	—	2.74	2.70	July 22	2.74	2.70
1970	2.76	2.72	—	2.72	2.68	—	July 22	2.76	2.72	—	2.76	2.72	July 22	2.76	2.72
1971	2.78	2.74	—	2.74	2.70	—	July 22	2.78	2.74	—	2.78	2.74	July 22	2.78	2.74
1972	2.80	2.76	—	2.76	2.72	—	July 22	2.80	2.76	—	2.80	2.76	July 22	2.80	2.76
1973	2.82	2.78	—	2.78	2.74	—	July 22	2.82	2.78	—	2.82	2.78	July 22	2.82	2.78
1974	2.84	2.80	—	2.80	2.76	—	July 22	2.84	2.80	—	2.84	2.80	July 22	2.84	2.80
1975	2.86	2.82	—	2.82	2.78	—	July 22	2.86	2.82	—	2.86	2.82	July 22	2.86	2.82
1976	2.88	2.84	—	2.84	2.80	—	July 22	2.88	2.84	—	2.88	2.84	July 22	2.88	2.84
1977	2.90	2.86	—	2.86	2.82	—	July 22	2.90	2.86	—	2.90	2.86	July 22	2.90	2.86
1978	2.92	2.88	—	2.88	2.84	—	July 22	2.92	2.88	—	2.92	2.88	July 22	2.92	2.88
1979	2.94	2.90	—	2.90	2.86	—	July 22	2.94	2.90	—	2.94	2.90	July 22	2.94	2.90
1980	2.96	2.92	—	2.92	2.88	—	July 22	2.96	2.92	—	2.96	2.92	July 22	2.96	2.92
1981	2.98	2.94	—	2.94	2.90	—	July 22	2.98	2.94	—	2.98	2.94	July 22	2.98	2.94
1982	3.00	2.96	—	2.96	2.92	—	July 22	3.00	2.96	—	3.00	2.96	July 22	3.00	2.96
1983	3.02	2.98	—	2.98	2.94	—	July 22	3.02	2.98	—	3.02	2.98	July 22	3.02	2.98
1984	3.04	3.00	—	3.00	2.96	—	July 22	3.04	3.00	—	3.04	3.00	July 22	3.04	3.00
1985	3.06	3.02	—	3.02	2.98	—	July 22	3.06	3.02	—	3.06	3.02	July 22	3.06	3.02
1986	3.08	3.04	—	3.04	3.00	—	July 22	3.08	3.04	—	3.08	3.04	July 22	3.08	3.04
1987	3.10	3.06	—	3.06	3.02	—	July 22	3.10	3.06	—	3.10	3.06	July 22	3.10	3.06
1988	3.12	3.08	—	3.08	3.04	—	July 22	3.12	3.08	—	3.12	3.08	July 22	3.12	3.08
1989	3.14	3.10	—	3.10	3.06	—	July 22	3.14	3.10	—	3.14	3.10	July 22	3.14	3.10
1990	3.16	3.12	—	3.12	3.08	—	July 22	3.16	3.12	—	3.16	3.12	July 22	3.16	3.12
1991	3.18	3.14	—	3.14	3.10	—	July 22	3.18	3.14	—	3.18	3.14	July 22	3.18	3.14
1992	3.20	3.16	—	3.16	3.12	—	July 22	3.20	3.16	—	3.20	3.16	July 22	3.20	3.16
1993	3.22	3.18	—	3.18	3.14	—	July 22	3.22	3.18	—	3.22	3.18	July 22	3.22	3.18
1994	3.24	3.20	—	3.20	3.16	—	July 22	3.24	3.20	—	3.24	3.20	July 22	3.24	3.20
1995	3.26	3.22	—	3.22	3.18	—	July 22	3.26	3.22	—	3.26	3.22	July 22	3.26	3.22
1996	3.28	3.24	—	3.24	3.20	—	July 22	3.28	3.24	—	3.28	3.24	July 22	3.28	3.24
1997	3.30	3.26	—	3.26	3.22	—	July 22	3.30	3.26	—	3.30	3.26	July 22	3.30	3.26
1998	3.32	3.28	—	3.28	3.24	—	July 22	3.32	3.28	—	3.32	3.28	July 22	3.32	3.28
1999	3.34	3.30	—	3.30	3.26	—	July 22	3.34	3.30	—	3.34	3.30	July 22	3.34	3.30
2000	3.36	3.32	—	3.32	3.28	—	July 22	3.36	3.32	—	3.36	3.32	July 22	3.36	3.32
2001	3.38	3.34	—	3.34	3.30	—	July 22	3.38	3.34	—	3.38	3.34	July 22	3.38	3.34
2002	3.40	3.36	—	3.36	3.32	—	July 22	3.40	3.36	—	3.40	3.36	July 22	3.40	3.36
2003	3.42	3.38	—	3.38	3.34	—	July 22	3.42	3.38	—	3.42	3.38	July 22	3.42	3.38
2004	3.44	3.40	—	3.40	3.36	—	July 22	3.44	3.40	—	3.44	3.40	July 22	3.44	3.40
2005	3.46	3.42	—	3.42	3.38	—	July 22	3.46	3.42	—	3.46	3.42	July 22	3.46	3.42
2006	3.48	3.44	—	3.44	3.40	—	July 22	3.48	3.44	—	3.48	3.44	July 22	3.48	3.44
2007	3.50	3.46	—	3.46	3.42	—	July 22	3.50	3.46	—	3.50	3.46	July 22	3.50	3.46
2008	3.52	3.48	—	3.48	3.44	—	July 22	3.52	3.48	—	3.52	3.48	July 22	3.52	3.48
2009	3.54	3.50	—	3.50	3.46	—	July 22	3.54	3.50	—	3.54	3.50	July 22	3.54	3.50
2010	3.56	3.52	—	3.52	3.48	—	July 22	3.56	3.52	—	3.56	3.52	July 22	3.56	3.52
2011	3.58	3.54	—	3.54	3.50	—	July 22	3.58	3.54	—	3.58	3.54	July 22	3.58	3.54
2012	3.60	3.56	—	3.56	3.52	—	July 22	3.60	3.56	—	3.60	3.56	July 22	3.60	3.56
2013	3.62	3.58	—	3.58	3.54	—	July 22	3.62	3.58	—	3.62	3.58	July 22	3.62	3.58
2014	3.64	3.60	—	3.60	3.56	—	July 22	3.64	3.60	—	3.64	3.60	July 22	3.64	3.60
2015	3.66	3.62	—	3.62	3.58	—	July 22	3.66	3.62	—	3.66	3.62	July 22	3.66	3.62
2016	3.68	3.64	—	3.64	3.60	—	July 22	3.68	3.64	—	3.68	3.64	July 22	3.68	3.64
2017	3.70	3.66	—	3.66	3.62	—	July 22	3.70	3.66	—	3.70	3.66	July 22	3.70	3.66
2018	3.72	3.68	—	3.68	3.64	—	July 22	3.72	3.68	—	3.72	3.68	July 22	3.72	3.68
2019	3.74	3.70	—	3.70	3.66	—	July 22	3.74	3.70	—	3.74</td				

Bond Transactions — New York Stock Exchange

For Week Ended Saturday, July 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BONDS

(Quotations after decimal point represent 32ds of a point)

TREASURY BONDS

	Sales in 1000s.	High. Low.	Net Chge.
1940 Range.	Sales in 1000s.	High. Low.	Last. Last Chge.
104.24 102.11 33 ^{1/2} 43-41 March	1	102.11 102.11	-15
105.17 103.12 34 ^{1/2} 41	2	103.12 103.12	-15
105.30 103.16 34 ^{1/2} 47-43	3	108.8 108.5	-4
105.11 107.12 24 ^{1/2} 45-48	4	108.12 108.11	-1
111.56 111.18 24 ^{1/2} 44-43 reg	5	108.1 108.0	+1
111.20 111.23 24 ^{1/2} 44-43 reg	6	113.23 113.22	+2
105.26 106.20 20 ^{1/2} 47-45	7	106.22 106.20	-10
109.12 106.20 20 ^{1/2} 47-45 reg	8	106.22 106.22	+27
112.13 108.23 31 ^{1/2} 49-46	9	111.9 111.4	-7
121.8 117.2 47-52	10	119.24 119.23	-14
105.24 104.10 12 ^{1/2} 50-48	11	103.03 103.03	-2
113.10 109.14 34 ^{1/2} 52-49	12	111.25 111.25	-11
107.2 102.2 24 ^{1/2} 53-49	13	105.11 105.11	-11
107.3 103.4 24 ^{1/2} 52-50	14	105.17 105.10	+2
108.30 104.16 24 ^{1/2} 54-51	15	107.9 107.6	-1
111.30 107.20 30 ^{1/2} 55-51	16	110.13 110.6	+4
104.23 101.7 24 ^{1/2} 53-51	17	103.5 103.5	+1
102.22 101.24 24 ^{1/2} 56-54	18	102.10 102.0	-10
106.16 104.16 24 ^{1/2} 55-55	19	107.24 107.20	-20
108.12 103.12 24 ^{1/2} 55-58	20	106.21 106.15	-2
108.1 103.15 24 ^{1/2} 65-60	21	106.13 106.9	+10
108.1 103.15 24 ^{1/2} 65-60	22	106.14 106.7	-2

FEDERAL FARM MORTGAGE BONDS

105.15 103.16 34 ^{1/2} 47-42	2	104.4 104.3	104.3 + 1
108.21 105.20 34 ^{1/2} 49-44	3	107.11 107.9	-5

HOME OWNERS LOAN BONDS

108.12 105.4 34 ^{1/2} 52-44	1	106.30 106.30	106.30 - 8
103.12 105.5 15 ^{1/2} 47-45	14	101.19 101.19	101.19 - 1

NEW YORK CITY BONDS

97 ^{1/2} 88 ^{1/2} 34 80	442	96	94% 95% - 1/2
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CORPORATION BONDS

57 ^{1/2} 27 ^{1/2} ABITIBI P & P 53	*127	38% 36%	37% - 1/2
104 ^{1/2} 97 ^{1/2} Adams Exp 45	5	100 99	99 + 1/2
104 ^{1/2} 95 ^{1/2} Adams Exp 47	6	100 100	100 + 1/2
57 ^{1/2} 60 ^{1/2} Am S 9% 46	7	75 74	74 + 4
89 ^{1/2} 60 ^{1/2} Alleghany Co 44	8	270 264	264 + 1
75 ^{1/2} 58 ^{1/2} Alleghany Co 54 49	9	65 72	73% - 1
47 ^{1/2} 28 ^{1/2} Alleghany Co 50 st	10	122 124	44% + 2
107 ^{1/2} 104 ^{1/2} Allegh Val 42	11	105 105	-15
99 ^{1/2} 88 ^{1/2} Allied Strs 41 ^{1/2} 51	12	95 95	+ 3
111 ^{1/2} 106 ^{1/2} Allis Chalm Cr 48	13	108 107	108% - 1/2
88 ^{1/2} 45 ^{1/2} Am & For P 58 2030	14	50 49	49% - 1/2
105 ^{1/2} 103 ^{1/2} Am Int C Chem 54 ^{1/2} 49	15	103% 102%	-2%
105 ^{1/2} 103 ^{1/2} Am Int C 54 ^{1/2} 49	16	98 98	98% - 1/2
109 ^{1/2} 103 ^{1/2} Am T & 54 ^{1/2} 43	17	108 106	106% - 1/2
110 ^{1/2} 103 ^{1/2} Am T & 54 ^{1/2} 66	18	102 102	102% + 1
104 ^{1/2} 103 ^{1/2} Am T & T 54 ^{1/2} 61	19	108 108	108% - 1/2
109 ^{1/2} 96 ^{1/2} Am W W & E 75	20	107 106	107% + 1/2
70 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} Anaconda Cop 41 ^{1/2} 50	21	103% 103%	-1/2
50 ^{1/2} 32 ^{1/2} Ann Arbor 45 55	22	104% 104%	-1/2
104 ^{1/2} 45 ^{1/2} Arm Int 54 57	23	104% 104%	-1/2
104 ^{1/2} 45 ^{1/2} Arm Int 54 57	24	104% 104%	-1/2
105 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} AT&SF 49 55	25	103 103	103% - 1/2
107 ^{1/2} 101 ^{1/2} AT&SF 49 55 reg	26	102 102	102% + 1
87 ^{1/2} 77 ^{1/2} AT&SF 41 48 95	27	86 ^{1/2} 85 ^{1/2}	+ 1/2
88 ^{1/2} 76 ^{1/2} AT&SF 41 48 95 st	28	85 ^{1/2} 85 ^{1/2}	+ 1/2
97 ^{1/2} 90 ^{1/2} AT&SF 49 55	29	95 95	+ 1/2
95 ^{1/2} 92 ^{1/2} AT&SF 49 55	30	96 96	+ 1/2
104 ^{1/2} 93 ^{1/2} AT&SF 49 55	31	103 103	103% + 1/2
97 ^{1/2} 92 ^{1/2} Atch & Cha A 41 ^{1/2} 44	32	94 ^{1/2} 94 ^{1/2}	+ 1/2
99 ^{1/2} 93 ^{1/2} Atch & Cha A 54 54	33	96 ^{1/2} 96 ^{1/2}	+ 1/2
77 ^{1/2} 64 ^{1/2} A C Line 1st 42	34	71 69	69 - 1/2
70 ^{1/2} 55 ^{1/2} A C Line 1st 52	35	63 61	63% - 1/2
62 ^{1/2} 41 ^{1/2} A C Line 42 ^{1/2} 54	36	128 127	127% - 1/2
76 ^{1/2} 61 ^{1/2} A C Line 54 55	37	68 64	64% - 1/2
21 ^{1/2} 21 ^{1/2} A C Line 54 55	38	33 32	32% - 1/2
34 ^{1/2} 23 ^{1/2} A C Line 54 55	39	30 28	29 + 1/2
75 ^{1/2} 62 ^{1/2} A C Gu & WI 54 56	40	70 70	70 + 3
107 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} A C Refin 3s 53	41	106 105	105% + 1/2
94 ^{1/2} 82 ^{1/2} Austin N & W 54 51	42	94% 94%	-1/2
70 ^{1/2} 55 ^{1/2} B & O 1st mtg 48 st	43	65 65	65% - 1/2
123 ^{1/2} 128 ^{1/2} B & O 24 ^{1/2} 50	44	35 35	35% - 1/2
29 ^{1/2} 124 ^{1/2} B & O 2000 st D	45	32 30	31% - 1/2
29 ^{1/2} 124 ^{1/2} B & O 96 st F	46	29 28	28% - 1/2
18 ^{1/2} 124 ^{1/2} B & O 96 st G	47	10 10	10% - 1/2
70 ^{1/2} 56 ^{1/2} B & O 48	48	56 55	55% - 1/2
61 ^{1/2} 43 ^{1/2} B&P&WV 41 ^{1/2} 51 st	49	57 57	57% + 1/2
49 ^{1/2} 32 ^{1/2} B&O S 50 st	50	45 44	44% - 1/2
58 ^{1/2} 46 ^{1/2} B&O T cn 53	51	53 52	52% - 1/2
70 ^{1/2} 54 ^{1/2} Bang & Aroo 54 51	52	60 59	59% + 1/2
108 ^{1/2} 88 ^{1/2} Bang & Aroo 54 53	53	90 90	90% - 1/2
123 ^{1/2} 127 ^{1/2} Bell T P 50 40 C	54	103 103	103% - 1/2
100 ^{1/2} 96 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 60	55	100 100	100% - 1/2
103 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 65	56	103 103	103% + 1/2
112 ^{1/2} 103 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 52	57	107 107	107% + 1/2
106 ^{1/2} 100 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 59	58	104 104	104% + 1/2
105 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 59	59	107 107	107% + 1/2
105 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 59	60	108 108	108% - 1/2
105 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 59	61	108 108	108% - 1/2
105 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 59	62	108 108	108% - 1/2
105 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 59	63	108 108	108% - 1/2
105 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 59	64	108 108	108% - 1/2
105 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 59	65	108 108	108% - 1/2
105 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 59	66	108 108	108% - 1/2
105 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 59	67	108 108	108% - 1/2
105 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 59	68	108 108	108% - 1/2
105 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 59	69	108 108	108% - 1/2
105 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 59	70	108 108	108% - 1/2
105 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 59	71	108 108	108% - 1/2
105 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 59	72	108 108	108% - 1/2
105 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 59	73	108 108	108% - 1/2
105 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 59	74	108 108	108% - 1/2
105 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 59	75	108 108	108% - 1/2
105 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 59	76	108 108	108% - 1/2
105 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 59	77	108 108	108% - 1/2
105 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 59	78	108 108	108% - 1/2
105 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 59	79	108 108	108% - 1/2
105 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 59	80	108 108	108% - 1/2
105 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 59	81	108 108	108% - 1/2
105 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 59	82	108 108	108% - 1/2
105 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 59	83	108 108	108% - 1/2
105 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 59	84	108 108	108% - 1/2
105 ^{1/2} 102 ^{1/2} Bell S 3s 59	85	108 108	108% - 1/2
105 ^{1/2}			

Bond Transactions—New York Stock Exchange—Continued

1940 Range.										1940 Range.										Range 1940.									
High.	Low.	Sales	in 1000s.	High.	Low.	Last.	Net	Chge.	High.	Low.	Sales	in 1000s.	High.	Low.	Last.	Net	Chge.	High.	Low.	Sales	in 1000s.	High.	Low.	Last.	Net	Chge.			
5714 46 NY Dock cv 5s 47.	5	485	47	47	47	47	-	-	3314 15% Schulco 6 1/2s 46 A st.	3	28	28	28	-	-	-	-	934 61 Canada 3s 61	12	72%	72%	72%	-	-					
5845 46% NY Dock Co 5s 51.	11	459	47	47	47	47	-	-	47 29 Schulco 6 1/2s 46 B st.	1	5	35	35	35	35	2	58% 59% Canada 3s 61	42	71%	69%	70%	-	-						
1104 10% NY Edis 3 1/2s 65.	28	1065	107	107	107	107	-	-	1234 11% Scitco V & N 5s 89.	3	115	115	115	+	-	-	-	89 55% Canada 3s 61	13	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
1107 105 NY Edis 3 1/2s 66.	7	1093	1094	1094	1094	1094	-	-	1094 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	4	45	45	45	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	14	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
1184 11% NY G El Edis 4s 49.	11	1168	116	116	116	116	+	%	1184 3% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	15	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
2494 15% NY NH & H Bv 4s 49.	33	11	12	12	12	12	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	16	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
2504 12% NY NH & H Bv 4s 49.	33	10	20	20	20	20	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	17	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
204 11% NY NH & H Bv 4s 49.	11	12	12	12	12	12	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	18	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
204 10% NY NH & H Bv 4s 56.	11	12	12	12	12	12	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	19	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
8% 3 NY O & W rig 4s 92.	19	45	45	45	45	45	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	20	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
1077 101 N Y Steam 3 1/2s 63.	39	1064	1064	1064	1064	1064	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	21	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
1112 106 N Y Tel 3 1/2s 67.	53	1114	1104	1111	1111	1111	+	%	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	22	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
6% 3 N Y & B Bond 4s 46.	18	4	34	34	34	34	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	23	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
112 107% Niagara Sh cv 5 1/2s 66.	18	109	109	109	109	109	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	24	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
104% 96% Niagara Sh cv 5 1/2s 66.	18	102	102	102	102	102	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	25	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
79 54% Norfolk & Son 5s 41.	17	73	70	70	70	70	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	26	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
175 7% Norlak Ss & Sons 61 ct.	10	12	12	12	12	12	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	27	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
184 8% Norlak Ss & Sons 61 A.	10	12	12	12	12	12	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	28	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
126 11% Nortel & W 4s 96.	1	123	123	123	123	123	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	29	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
108% 102% Nor Am Co 4s 58.	5	1064	1064	1064	1064	1064	+	%	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	30	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
104% 101% Nor Am Co 4s 58.	5	1064	1064	1064	1064	1064	+	%	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	31	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
107% 104% Nor Pac 4s 2047.	240	569	575	581	581	581	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	32	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
56 40% Nor Pac 5s 2047 D.	45	534	51	51	51	51	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	33	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
49% 33% Nor Pac 4s 2047.	70	474	454	454	454	454	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	34	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
70 58% Nor Pac 4s 97 reg.	34	67	66	66	66	66	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	35	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
43% 31% Nor Pac 4s 2047.	14	64	63	63	63	63	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	36	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
103% 105% Nor Pac 5s 2047.	21	40	42	42	42	42	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	37	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
108% 107% OHIO CONN BY 4s 43.	1	107%	107%	107%	107%	107%	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	38	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
109% 104% Ohio Ed 4s 65.	12	108	108	108	108	108	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	39	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
110 101% Ohio Ed 3 1/2s 72.	12	106	106	106	106	106	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	40	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
107 103% Oklahoma G & E 4s 46.	2	105	105	105	105	105	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	41	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
108% 104% Oil Nat Fw 5s 43.	2	94	94	94	94	94	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	42	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
110 105% Oil Nat Fw 5s 43.	2	104	104	104	104	104	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	43	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
112 104% Pac T&T 3 1/2s 66.	7	108	108	108	108	108	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	44	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
103 104% Panhandle EPL 4s 52.	7	104	104	104	104	104	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	45	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
51% 50% Panhandle Bway 3 55 ct.	1	47	47	47	47	47	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	46	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
90% 78% Paraflo T 6 44.	2	85	84	84	84	84	+	%	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	47	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
47 46% Paraflo T 6 44.	2	40	40	40	40	40	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	48	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
125% 12% Paraflo T 6 44.	5	101	101	101	101	101	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	49	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
126% 12% Paraflo T 6 44.	5	101	101	101	101	101	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	50	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
127% 12% Paraflo T 6 44.	5	101	101	101	101	101	-	-	1184 2% Seal A L cn 4s 45.	2	23	23	23	-	-	-	-	90 56% Canada 2 1/2s 44	51	71%	70%	70%	-	-					
128% 12% Paraflo T 6 44.	5	101	101	101	101	101	-	-	1184 2																				

Transactions on the New York Curb Exchange

For Week Ended Saturday, July 27

Stocks and bonds marked with a dagger are fully listed on the Curb Exchange; others are dealt in as unlisted issues.

Range 1940 Stock and Dividend High. Low. Net Sales.

in Dollars. High. Low. Last. Chg. Sales.

1244 12 ACM E Wire (.25e) 184 184 184 1/4 10 1,800

634 4 Aircorp Sup B (4%) 5 5 5/4 + 1/4 700

1424 10 Air Assoc (1/2) 11 11 11 - 100

392 15 Air Investors 100 98 98 1/4 - 20

1082 904 Air Pow 27 pf (7) 92 92 92 1/4 40

98 82 Air Prod Co (6) 111 111 111 1/4 50

1114 1114 Air Std pf (7) 111 111 111 1/4 50

116 8 Allied Prod (1) 174 174 174 1/4 100

21 11 Allied Prod A (1%) 174 174 174 1/4 600

1294 1394 Alum Cr Am (2e) 155 150 155 1/4 100

1184 108 Alum Cr Am pf (6) 113 113 113 1/4 200

1107 424 Alum Ltd (14%) 60 59 59 1/4 50

494 36 Am Book 36 36 36 1/4 50

754 4 Am Box Board 36 36 36 1/4 400

164 26 Am Ctr F & L B. 32 31 32 1/4 6,900

194 26 Am Exp Lines (2e) 104 94 94 1/4 2,500

394 254 Am Gas & El (1/20) 32 32 33 1/4 375

1118 1074 Am Gas & El pf (4%) 111 111 111 1/4 400

4 28 Am Gen 32 pf (2) 24 24 24 1/4 - 400

164 118 Am Light & T (1.20) 14 14 14 1/4 14

5 4 Am Maracalbo 5 5 5 1/4 + 1/4 900

1024 64 Am Seal-Kp (12e) 4 4 4 + 1/4 1,100

34 36 Am Superpower 1 pf 66 65 65 1/4 200

75 48 Am Superpower pf 11 11 11 1/4 300

17 1 Am Sup Post F 11 11 11 1/4 100

1 1 Am Wapp 11 11 11 1/4 200

15 8 Apex Elec Mfg (2e) 104 104 104 1/4 100

115 106 Appel E P P (7) 112 112 112 1/4 400

23 13 Ark Nat Gas A 21 21 21 1/4 1,300

124 12 Ark Nat Gas G pf (90%) 49 49 49 1/4 800

164 64 Ark Oil pf (40%) 49 49 49 1/4 800

14 4 Ark G & El A 4 4 4 + 1/4 800

14 4 Ark G & El A 4 4 4 + 1/4 800

14 4 Ark G & El A 4 4 4 + 1/4 800

14 4 Ark G & El A 4 4 4 + 1/4 800

14 4 Ark G & El A 4 4 4 + 1/4 800

14 4 Ark G & El A 4 4 4 + 1/4 800

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14 4 Ark G &

Transactions on the New York Curb Exchange—Continued

Range 1940		Stock and Dividend	Net	Sales.	Range 1940	Sales	Net	Sales	1940 Range	Sales	Net				
High.	Low.	in Dollars.	High.	Low.	Last.	Chg.	in 1000s.	High.	Low.	Last.	Chg.	High.	Low.	Sales	Net
15%	15%	Barrett Corp vtc	↑ 5%	15%	14%	- 1%	200	49	37	Chi Ry 5s 27 ct.	↑ 31	42%	40%	43	- 1%
45%	2%	Star Br Strs	↑ 2%	2%	2%	+ 1%	100	93%	77	Cin St Ry 5s 52	2	83	83	83	+ 1
94%	7%	Ster Al Fr (40c)	↑ 7%	7%	4%	- 4%	100	95%	78	Cin St Ry 5s 55 B	5	85	84%	85	+ 1
35%	1%	Steri Inc (20) xd	↑ 1%	1%	1%	+ 1%	500	78	65	Cities Service 5s 66	10	77	77	77	- 1%
2%	1%	Sunray Oil (0.05c)	↑ 1%	1%	1%	- 1%	200	80	70	Cities Service 5s 58	8	79	79	79	- 1%
5%	2%	TAGGART (K) Dist	2%	2%	2%	- 1%	300	75%	65%	Cities Service 5s 58	49	75%	75%	75%	- 1%
15%	2%	Technicolor (14c)	↑ 2%	2%	2%	+ 1%	8,600	75%	65%	Cit Ser PAL 5s 49	20	86%	85%	86	- 1%
114%	103	Texas P. & L. pf (7)	109	108	109	- 1%	60	92%	75%	Cit S PAL 5s 52	66	86%	84%	85	+ 1
2%	2%	Texas Oil & L. (20c)	↑ 2%	2%	2%	+ 1%	200	98	81	Commun PAL s 57	67	98	96	98	+ 3
24%	12%	Theew Shovel (1c)	18	17%	18	- 1%	500	111%	105	Con G E L Ba 34s 71	10	111%	110	110	- 1%
15%	7%	Thile Roof (55a)	73	7	7	+ 1%	500	104%	104	Con G E L Ba 34s 69	7	100%	100	100	- 1%
5%	3%	Thine Prod Ex (40c)	4%	4%	4%	- 1%	600	92%	82%	Con G E L Ba 34s 69	128	128	128	128	- 1%
115%	104	Toledo Edm 7% q (7)	113	113	113	- 2%	10	90%	75%	Con G E L Ba 34s 69	17	88	86%	86	- 1%
1%	1%	Tonopah Min	1%	1%	1%	- 1%	100	94	90	Cost Gas Ut 4s 41	76	91%	90%	90	- 1%
1%	1%	Trans-Lux (.10c)	2%	2%	2%	- 1%	700	99%	93	Cudahy Pack 3% 55	8	96%	96	96	- 1%
10%	1%	Transwest Oil	2%	2%	2%	- 1%	100	107	104	DEL EL POW 5s 59	2	100%	100%	100%	+ 1
1%	1%	Tri-Cont war	1%	1%	1%	- 1%	700	107	104	DEL EL POW 5s 59	100	100%	100%	100%	+ 1
10%	1%	Tubize Chai	1%	1%	1%	- 1%	200	107	104	DEL EL POW 5s 59	97	81	81	81	+ 1%
6%	3%	UDVIL CORP (.30c)	14%	13%	14%	- 1%	3,000	85%	74%	EAST G&E 5s 56 A	↑ 60	78%	78%	78%	- 1%
3%	1%	Unexcited Mfg	12%	11%	11%	- 1%	100	112	108	Edison El Blum 3s 65	18	110%	110%	110%	- 1%
13%	7%	Union G Can (80a)	8%	7%	8%	+ 1%	300	106	103	El Paso El 5s 50 A	1	104%	104%	104%	+ 1
5%	5%	Unit Airc Pr (10c)	12	11	11	- 1%	1,800	84%	70	Elec PAL s 2030	243	82%	82%	82	+ 1%
1%	1%	Unit Clig Wh Strs	1%	1%	1%	- 1%	3,100	120	110	Elmira Wat L 5s 56	3	117%	117%	117%	- 1%
1%	1%	Unit Gas	1%	1%	1%	- 1%	3,600	105%	101%	Empire Dis E 5s 52	5	104%	104%	104%	+ 1
113%	83%	Unit Gas pr (6%)	111	110	110	- 1%	100	101%	89	FED WATER 5s 54	5	98%	98%	98%	- 1%
1%	1%	Unit Lt & Pow A	1%	1%	1%	- 1%	4,000	105	100	Fia P&L 5s 54	37	104%	104%	104%	+ 1
1%	1%	Unit Lt & Pow B	1%	1%	1%	- 1%	200	104%	95%	Fia Pow 4s 66 C	4	103%	103%	103%	+ 1
39%	16%	Unit Lt & Pow pf	25%	24%	25%	+ 1%	6,100	87%	56	GATIN'U Pow 3% 69	22	66%	65%	66	+ 1%
53%	54%	Unit Show M (24a)	66	63	64%	- 1%	1,075	102	94	Gen Pub S 5s 53	6	98%	97%	97	+ 1%
35%	34%	Unit Show M pf (1%)	44%	42%	42%	- 1%	500	100%	83	Gen Pub Ut 6s 56	19	100%	99%	99	+ 1%
7%	3%	Unit Specialties	6%	6%	6%	- 1%	1,300	101	89	Gen W Wk 5s 43 A	13	99%	99%	99	+ 1%
1%	1%	Unit Spec Inv Sec	1%	1%	1%	- 1%	300	107%	103%	Geo Pow 5s 67	33	105%	105%	105%	+ 1
71	47	U.S. I. Set pf (114%)	51%	51%	51%	+ 1%	200	75	59	Geo Pow 5s 78	12	70%	70%	70%	- 1%
34%	34%	U.S. Foll B	4%	4%	4%	- 1%	600	75%	65%	Grand Trunk 5s 65	29	70%	71%	71%	+ 1%
2%	2%	U.S. Rail Rec	3%	3%	3%	- 1%	100	105%	104%	Green Mt Pow 3% 63	1	103%	103%	103%	+ 1
3%	3%	United States	1%	1%	1%	- 1%	1,000	42%	42%	Grand Trunk 5s 65	42%	103%	103%	103%	+ 1
13%	14%	U.S. Wall Pap	1%	1%	1%	- 1%	100	105%	99%	Green Mt Pow 3% 63	2	29%	29%	29%	+ 1
1%	1%	U.S. Wlct Pict	1%	1%	1%	- 1%	50	105%	104%	Green Mt Pow 3% 63	2	29%	29%	29%	+ 1
23%	19%	Utah W. Co. (50c)	17	17	17	- 1%	800	105%	100%	Hous Gulf Gs 43	5	102%	102%	102%	+ 1
72	48%	Utah P. & L. pf (31%)	65	65	65	- 1%	25	81	55	Hous Lg & P 3% 66	5	110%	109%	109%	+ 1
1%	1%	Utility Equit	1%	1%	1%	- 1%	400	64	64	Hygrade Fd 4s 49 A	7	68	67%	67%	+ 1
1%	1%	VALSPAR CORP	1%	1%	1%	- 1%	2,700	105%	104%	IIL POW L 5s 50 C	58	105%	104%	104%	+ 1
1%	1%	Venezuel Pet	1%	1%	1%	- 1%	1,500	101%	98	IIL Pow L 5s 54	9	98%	97%	97	+ 1
7%	6%	Volter Alrc	6%	6%	6%	- 1%	200	107%	101	IIL Pow L 5s 54	24	105%	104%	104%	+ 1
6%	3%	WACO AIRC	3%	3%	3%	- 1%	100	107%	98%	IIL Pow L 5s 54 B	14	105%	105%	105%	+ 1
5%	3%	Walstt B A	3%	3%	3%	- 1%	200	94%	85%	Ind Svc 5s 63 A	100	11%	69%	69%	+ 1
102%	92%	W Tex Ut 36 pf (6)	97	97	97	- 1%	10	109%	105	Indupas F & L 3% 68	17	105%	104%	104%	+ 1
1%	1%	West Eng	1%	1%	1%	- 1%	30	49%	41%	Int P Sec 5s 57 E	7	23%	22%	23	+ 1
1%	1%	West Eng	1%	1%	1%	- 1%	50	47%	40%	Int P Sec 5s 57 F	11	24%	25%	25	+ 1
1%	1%	West Eng	1%	1%	1%	- 1%	50	43%	39%	Int P Sec 6s 55 C	2	23%	23%	23%	+ 1
1%	1%	Wichita R Oil	6	6	6	- 1%	900	51%	49%	Inter Pow 5s 52	24	38%	38%	38%	+ 1
9%	5%	Wilson-Jones (1%)	64%	61%	61%	- 1%	200	71%	61%	Inter Pow 5s 52	49	60%	60%	60%	+ 1
4%	4%	Wolverine Port Cem	4%	4%	4%	- 1%	400	107%	104%	Inter Pow 5s 52	10	105%	104%	104%	+ 1
7%	4%	Wolverine T (1%)	4%	4%	4%	- 1%	600	109%	104%	Inter Pow 5s 52	2	106%	105%	105%	+ 1
3%	3%	Wright Harg (40c)	4%	3%	3%	- 1%	1,700	42%	30%	Int Sup Pow 6s 63 A	15	38	37	38	+ 1
53%	38%	JACKSNV GAS 5s 42 st	22	46	46	- 1%	100	105%	104%	JACKSNV GAS 5s 42 st	22	46	46	46	+ 1
106%	103%	LONG ISL LT 6s 45	9	104%	104%	- 1%	100	104%	104%	LONG ISL LT 6s 45	9	98%	98%	98%	+ 1
108%	103%	Loe F & L 5s 57	5	107%	106%	- 1%	100	105%	104%	Loe F & L 5s 57	5	108%	107%	107%	+ 1
95%	91%	MENGE CO 4% 47	1	93%	93%	- 1%	100	104%	104%	West Pa 5s 60	12	4%	4%	4%	+ 1
109%	104%	Metro Ed 71	1	106%	106%	- 1%	100	106	106	West Pa 5s 60	8	104%	104%	104%	+ 1
111%	110%	Metro Ed 45 G	1	106%	106%	- 1%	100	108%	108%	West Pa 5s 60	17	107%	107%	107%	+ 1
105%	90%	Midland Val 5s 43	13	101%	100%	- 1%	100	70	51	Midland Val 5s 43	4	60	59	59	+ 1
108%	104%	Mid G & E 31s 60	13	108%	108%	- 1%	100	104%	104%	Mid G & E 31s 60	2	100%	100%	100%	+ 1
105%	104%	Mid G & E 2% 50	3	105%	105%	- 1%	100	104%	104%	Mid G & E 31s 60	1	100%	100%	100%	+ 1
111%	104%	Appal Ed Pow 4s (3)	13	108%	108%	- 1%	100	104%	104%	Mid G & E 31s 60	1	100%	100%	100%	+ 1
108%	102%	Ark P & L 5s 56	6	105%	105%	- 1%	100	105%	105%	Mid G & E 31s 60	1	100%	100%	100%	+ 1
62%	38%	As Elec 4% 53	39	50%	50%	- 1%	100	101%	101%	Mo Elec Co 3% 60	6	108%	108%	108%	+ 1
28%	10%	As Elec & L 5s 68	23	15%	14%	- 1%	100	101%	101%	Mo Elec Co 3% 60	33	101%	101%	101%	+ 1
20%	10%	As G & E 4% 48	24	24%	24%	- 1%	100	101%	101%	Mo Elec Co 3% 60	100%	100%	100%	100%	+ 1
30%	11%	As G & E 4% 48	11	14%	14%	- 1%	100	101%							

Postwar Europe

Continued from Page 143

on a barter basis, with "labor currency" (whatever that may mean) as the basis for its monetary system.

Even if one could agree that life was just a matter of logic as conceived by man, and philosophically there is not much reason for agreeing with that viewpoint, it is possible on the present premises to look for another end than that visualized in this interesting article.

The outstanding factor of Hitler's regime, of which the writer of the article and the quoted letter fail to take cognizance, and which must be the basic premise for their flight of logic, is that Hitler and the German people, for the past years and especially recently, have been engaged in destruction, not in production. To me this is the most important factor to be used as a premise if we are to engage in a logical discussion. Hitler and his group have spent their time and energy in destroying and consuming what had been built up by others. Like the man on the bicycle, mentioned in the article, when Hitler comes to the end of his destruction he falls off. It is the end of his road. He is the destroyer, and as such must come to his end in the cul-de-sac of the chaos he is creating.

For what are we to expect if the war ends tomorrow? Can we imagine an about-face command that will turn his machine abruptly from destruction to production? Can one imagine a group such as now controlling German economy having the flair to think in terms of constructive effort? Again look at their record of seven years before this war. German economy moved lower and lower; the level of consumption was perhaps the lowest that Germans have ever witnessed.

Many of your readers will recall the days in this country after the last war, from 1919 to 1921—and hectic days they were—in which we strove to find a way out by which our productive capacity could be turned over to the manufacturers of articles needed by people in times of peace; with all the freedom for individuals to seek a way out of their difficulties; with all the ingenuity and inventive spirit of the American people, and all our material resources. At the end of a period of prosperity, with all the fat to feed on, we were forced to pass through several years of hardship.

The European situation today is infinitely worse, and the end is not yet in sight; for, just as the Europe of 1920 was not that of 1910, so the Europe of 1940 will not be that of 1930. The restrictions and obligations of the Versailles Treaty have, together with, as one writer jokingly remarked, "the desire of every little language to have a country of its own," made it impossible in 1920 to gather up the threads of trade dropped in 1914. Europe as a whole had been impoverished by the war and had found no avenue of escape from their dilemma under the new conditions imposed by peace. The present war is a continuation of that breakdown. Hitler himself is one of the effects; he and his group are an additional factor in causing a further breakdown.

If arms are laid down through exhaustion in this struggle, the disruption of trade and the degeneration of spirits will be almost chaotic. If there is to be added to these the probability of the horror of famine, which is not impossible this winter, there is more likely to be a further breakdown into whatever fragments can subsist on the nourishment of their own few acres. This is the possibility, rather than a united Europe under an economic machine that goes ahead full blast to capture trade in South America and the rest of the world on a barter basis.

One cannot refrain from further touch-

ing on the paragraph dealing with barter and gold. One would imagine, from the encomiums written on German "barter," that it was a new invention rather than the throw-back to a primitive economy. It spells poverty—the last effort of a dying man to trade his shirt.

This new "labor currency" has been expounded at great length many times, and last week The New York Times in its financial section quoted at length from a German "authority." If one studies this as an engineer does a blueprint and tries to construct or visualize this new "labor currency," he can visualize only one method for producing this new currency—a printing press turning out paper bearing the insignia—"Pax Germanica—20 Marks." But when we turn to gold, there is important and weighty evidence supported by historical back-

ground that it is the only medium of exchange that cannot easily be counterfeited by the politician. With gold as a cover against any new currency, assuming that Europe is to be unified into a new economic union, it is much more likely that their new currency will have public confidence and survive.

When the battle in Europe is lost and won, won and lost, it is more likely that the United States will, in a humanitarian gesture, utilize our gold to buy foodstuffs here and in South America to feed a starving Europe. Many years will elapse and many trials and tribulations be undergone before a unified Europe becomes a modern going concern, in the industrial sense. There will be no markets in Europe for American exports unless the United States can provide credit. The gold at Fort Knox, which is described in

the article as a dead memorial to democracy, will instead remain one of the few liquid assets left in this world to revive the economic life of Europe.

CHAS. B. H. DELLER
New York, June 27, 1940.

Abstracts

Continued from Page 141

manufacturing activity gradual enough to permit a satisfactory adjustment of capacity difficulties.

Economic Conditions (National City Bank of N. Y., July, 1940). The appropriations for national defense have altered materially, but confusedly, the financial outlook of the government for the fiscal year beginning July 1. Though most of these sums apply to the current year, it seems hardly possible that the pace of production of the new programs can be sufficiently rapid to distribute all available funds by June 30, 1941. Disbursements of funds for shipbuilding will be spread over a period of six years.

Expenditures for defense will bring our appropriations and authorizations for 1941 to \$5,378,000,000. This does not include the \$4,000,000,000 for shipbuilding "nor certain items intended for defense in the Civil Aeronautics Authority, Civilian Conservation Corps, WPA," etc. These expenses are to be met partly by funds raised by taxation. The increased tax rates will not be fully reflected in the first year of their operation. The program broadens the base, bears more heavily on luxuries, and yields about \$715,000,000 for the fiscal year 1941. Total expenditures for that period are estimated at \$9,027,000,000. In order to provide leeway for financing the defense program, the upper limit for direct debt has been raised to \$49,000,000,000.

Utility Rate Making as a Social Objective, by W. D. Gay (Public Utility Fortnightly, June 4, 1940). A new criterion has been proposed by Chairman Olds and Commissioner Scott of the Federal Power Commission, which instead of considering a fair rate of return as the important test, advises that we think in terms of "sales policy." General consumption should be increased by inviting consumers to use more electricity. In other words it ought to be the basic policy of regulatory bodies to create incentives for the wide consumption of electricity, which would in itself induce competition and reduce rates. Further stimulus to consumption might be provided by working out rate cuts in terms of indicated current year's sales, rather than in terms of sales of the previous year.

This industry is largely privately owned, and for this reason it is questioned if the social concept ought to be given priority over the financial. Would undue competition destroy capital? To this latter inquiry Mr. Gay replies that in the electric industry excessive competition would be injurious. There is, however, a considerable question whether rates can be reduced substantially further than they now stand.

In spite of the recent stepping up of sales to the users of electricity, war conditions make rapid reduction of rates inadvisable, and advertising and promotional activities of electric companies will probably be less effective. It would therefore seem that emphasis on sales policy in rate regulation might have an adverse effect on a good part of the electric industry, especially upon the companies with heavy residential loads. The present method of regulation has permitted the industry to attract new money and ought not be dropped in favor of an untried method.

Financial News of the Week

Continued from Page 165

bonds, due in 1960, are to be 3½%, it is understood.

Philip Morris & Co. (9-7-39)—See item under American Tobacco.

Radio Corporation (6-20-40)—Operations of the Radio-Carrier Company, subsidiary of this company, at its Camden (N. J.) plant, have been expanding steadily in recent months and currently all available floor space is being used. Concurrently, employment figures have risen and now are in the neighborhood of 13,000, probably the highest point in recent years.

Remington Rand (6-20-40)—Domestic sales for quarter ended June 30, 1940, totaled \$3,115,000, compared with \$6,647,000 in like period of 1939, an increase of \$1,468,000, or 22.1 per cent. Company pointed out that its report for the June quarter and the six months did not reflect United States Government orders for equipment to be used in the national defense program, manufacture of which is just beginning in plants at Marietta, Ohio, and Tonawanda, N. Y.

Reynolds Tobacco (4-11-40)—See item under American Tobacco.

Ryan Aeronautical—The company announced receipt of an \$800,000 order from a foreign government for production of military training planes similar to those recently delivered to the United States Army.

Waldorf System—The New York Stock Exchange has been advised of the granting of an option to A. Yates Clark to buy 7,500 common shares at \$8 each until Dec. 31, 1942, and of an option to T. Walter Sharpe to buy 3,750 common shares at that price over the same period.

Wright Aeronautical (7-23-40)—No settlement has been reached as yet on a proposal whereby this company, with assistance of the Federal Government, will raise \$20,000,000 for construction of a new engine-building plant. Several plans have been proposed and discussed, it is understood, including a leasing arrangement and RFC loan and one whereby the RFC would underwrite a common stock sale to be made through private investment houses.

Yellow Truck and Coach (7-25-40)—The War Department has awarded a \$215,334 contract to this company for trucks.

RAILROADS

Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe (5-9-40)—See item under Baldwin Locomotive.

Atlantic Coast Line (2-29-40)—The road as owner of 51 per cent, or 596,700 shares of Louisville & Nashville Railroad stock, will receive \$1,640,925 as result of declaration of a dividend of \$2.75 a share by L. & N. directors for payment on Aug. 26, 1940.

Boston & Maine (6-27-40)—The road announced the consummation July 25, 1940, of its voluntary bond adjustment plan. Bondholders who had assented would receive \$500 in new 4 per cent first mortgage twenty-year bonds and \$500 in new 4% per cent thirty-year income bonds for each \$1,000 principal amount, and those who so elected would receive \$300 in cash in lieu of a like amount of the twenty-year four per cent bonds.

Chicago & North Western (6-6-40)—The I. C. C. has approved only \$442,844 of the fees sought by counsel and others in connection with the reorganization of the railroad.

Thus slightly more than half of the \$822,082 that was asked was allowed by the commission. The claims that were affirmed are set forth in a table accompanying a summary of the report which Division 4 of the I. C. C., acting for the agency, is submitting.

Erie (7-18-40)—The trustees have petitioned the Federal Court for permission to buy for \$200,000 certain switching terminal properties of the Jamestown, Westfield & Northwestern Railroad Company.

Illinois Central (6-20-40)—See item under American Car & Foundry.

Louisville & Nashville (2-8-40)—See item under Atlantic Coast Line.

Reading Company (8-10-39)—See item under American Locomotive and Baldwin Locomotive.

UTILITIES

International Paper and Power (7-11-40)—Proposed offering of \$32,000,000 first mortgage bonds, which had been under consideration for July 25, has been postponed. It had been expected that the financing plan could be completed before Aug. 1 in order to permit the call of company's 6 per cent refunding mortgage bonds on the next redemption date, Sept. 1, 1940, but it was found impractical to carry out the original time schedule.

Pacific Gas and Electric (5-2-40)—San Francisco city officials have submitted to Secretary Ickes a plan for the city to lease the electric distribution facilities of this company. The plan, if acceptable to the Secretary, would end years of controversy among the company, the city and the Interior Department over distribution of San Francisco consumers of electric power from the Federal Government's Hetch-Hetchy dam project.

Standard Gas and Electric (7-11-40)—The company has filed with SEC details of its plan for divesting itself of control of San Diego Consolidated Gas and Electric Company as part of the simplification and integration of its holding company system under the "death sentence" cause of Public Utility Holding Company Act.

United Light and Power—The company has embarked on a broad program of recapitalization and corporate simplification designed to meet the standards of Section 11 (b) (2) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act. The company, in filing a plan of recapitalization with the SEC for approval said the concern desired to eliminate preferred dividend arrears and to pave the way for resumption of dividends.

Basic objectives of the plan, according to the application filed with the commission, are to adjust the capital structure of United Light and Power to meet the requirements of the Holding Company Act and to place the company in the best position to solve its remaining problems.

Under the plan United Light and Power proposes to create one new class of capital stock to be issued in place of outstanding preferred, Class A and Class B common shares.

The plan provides that the company will have a total stock capitalization of \$72,000,000, consisting of 6,000,000 shares of \$12 par value, all of one class. The company has outstanding 600,000 shares of \$6 preferred stock with arrears of \$49.50 a share, 2,421,192 shares of Class A common stock and 1,055,576 shares of Class B common stock. It proposes to issue 3,347,676 shares of the new capital stock, having an aggregate par value of \$40,172,112, for the existing securities.

MISCELLANEOUS

Interstate Department Stores (6-15-39)—Sales are moving sharply higher because of abnormally hot weather throughout the middle Atlantic and Middle Western States. In the five months ended June 30 sales were 3 per cent above a year ago. July volume was substantially better. No official figures are available, but trade reports indicate that the company will earn \$200,000 or more in the six months ended July as contrasted with a loss of \$121,000 in the corresponding months of last year.

Loft, Inc. (6-13-40)—See item under Pepsi-Cola.

Pepsi-Cola (8-10-39)—The company has declared a dividend of 45¢ a share on common stock. Similar amount was paid on June 10, 1940. W. S. Mack Jr., president, said sales for the period showed a gain of 41 per cent over comparable half of 1939. Despite an increase of \$875,000 in sales promotion and advertising expenses, net income was 16 per cent above 1939 levels.

Mr. Mack stated that word had just been received of a favorable decision from the highest court of Jamaica, B. W. I., denying the petition of Coca-Cola Company for leave to appeal to the Privy Council in London, England, a prior decision in favor of the Pepsi-Cola Company.

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Industrial Stocks

Key.	Bid	Offer
Alabama Mills	11/2	2%
American Arch	30/4	33%
Am Cyanamid	5% cv pf	
1st series	11/2	12%
Am Cyanamid	5% cv pf	
2d series	11/2	12%
Am Dist 5% cum pf	23/4	31%
Amer Enka	45/8	48/2
Amer Hardware	22/4	
Amer Maize	15/4	15%
American Mfg 5% cum pf	65/4	70
Argo Oil	3/2	
Arlington Mills	23	25%
Armstrong Rubber (a)	48/2	52
Art Metal Construction	12/2	15
Autocar Co	6	7%
Botany Worsted M A	1%	3
Botany Worsted \$1.25 pf	3%	4%
Brown & Sharpe Mfg Co	163	167

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WISCONSIN
DAILY 5392 MILW. 488

Buckeye Steel Cast.	15%	17%
Chilton Co.	3	4
City & Suburban Homes.	5	6
Coca-Cola Bottling N Y	64	66
Colgate-Palmolive	74/2	94%
Columbia Bak 5% cum pf	17/2	20%
Compo Shoe Mach conv cum pf.	48	51
Cons Aircraft	54/2	57/2
Crowell-Collier Pub.	20/2	23%
Cuban Am Manganese Cp	7%	8%
Cutter Products	108	115
Dentists Supply	4	57
Devos & Raymonds B.	13	15
Dictaphone Co.	33/4	37
Dixon (J) Crucible	23/2	27
Domestic Finance pf	27/2	30%
Draper Corp.	61/2	65/2
East Sugar Assoc.	6	7%
Eastman Kodak	16/2	18/2
Farmers Tr & Radio	12%	24%
Fashion Park Assoc	1	
Fashion Park Assoc pf	4	5%
Follansbee Bros new com	5	5%
Follansbee Bros old pf	12	13%
Follansbee Bros new pf	19	21
Foundation Co.	14	24%
General Machinery Corp.	46/2	48/2
Giddings & Lewis Mach Tr.	26/2	28/2
Good Humor	31/2	44%
Gratton & Knight	31/2	51/2

Key.

Key.	Bid	Offer
Gatson & Knight 7% pf.	43/2	48%
Great Lakes 8%	38/2	41
Great Northern Paper	41	44
Harrisburg Steel	11/2	13
Hearst Consol Pub pf.	5/2	5%
Interstate Bals	13/4	15%
Interstate Bals pf.	23/4	26
Jonas & Naumburg	15/2	24
King Seeley	7/2	8%
Landers, Frank & Clara	21	28
Lawrence Portland Cem't	11	12%
Long-Bell Lum conv pf.	56	59
Mallory (P R) & Co.	12/2	13%
Marlin Rockwell	48/2	50%
Merck & Co.	59	61
Mercy & Co 6% pf	115	
Muskogee Plant Ring	13/2	14%
National Casket	51/2	53
National Paper & Type	31/2	44%
Nati Pap & Type 5% pf	21/2	25%
New Britain Machine	37/2	39%
New England Gas	100	102%
New Haven 5% pf wv	90	95
Ohio Match	91/2	10%
Pan American Match	12/2	13%
Pepsi-Cola Co.	220	235
Permaut Co	41/2	51/2
Petrolite & Power	15/2	22%
Pilgrim Explor	15/2	21%
Piper Aircraft	8	8%
Polaroic Corp	27	29
Pollard Corp	100	124%
Remington Arms	41/2	5%
Safety Car H & L	38/2	41%
Savannah Sugar	27	29/2
Scovill Mfg	24	25%
Singer Mfg	103	105
Skaneateles Rayon	3%	4%
St. Louis Sewn	37	37
Stanley Works	43/2	45/2
Stromberg-Carlson Tel	35/2	38/2
Sylvania Ind	17	18%
Tampax, Inc	27	37%
Taylor Wharton Ir & Stl	78	8%
Tenn Products	21/2	27%
Thompson Aut Arms Corp	12	13
Time, Inc.	110	120
Time-O-Tel & Pub	12%	13%
Trico Products	31/2	34
Triumph Explosives	31/2	4%
United Artists Theatre	3	1%
United Piece Dye Works	16	16%
United Piece Dye Wks pf	12	27%
Veeder Root	50/2	61%
Wabash Pipe Juices	108	21%
Welch Grape Juices	41/2	51/2
West Indies Sugar	41/2	51/2
West Michigan Steel	74	82%
Western Dairies vtc	2	2%
Western Dairies cum pf	31/2	34
Wickwire Spangler Stl	41/2	51/2
Willcox & Gibbs	8	8%
Worcester Salt	42/2	43%
York Ice Machinery	2	31/2
York Ice Machinery pf	24/2	27/2

*Ex dividend.

Bank Stocks

Boston:

First National	41/2	44
Merchants National	370	390
National Rockland	58	68
National Shawmut	21/2	23%
Second National	130	140
State St Trust	300	
U S Trust	91/2	114
U S Trust pf	12	14
Webster & Atlas	47	52

Chicago:

Am National Bank Tr.	180	190
Cont'l Ill Bk & Tr.	71/2	73/2
First National	198	203
Harris Trust & Sav.	284	297
Northern Trust	474	487

Milwaukee:

Marine Nat Exch Bank	39	43
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New Haven:

First Nat B & T	40	43
N Hay Bk N B A	50	62
Second Nat Bank	69	72
U & N H Tr Co	104	110

New York City:

Bank of Manhattan Co.	15/2	17
Bank of Yorktown	40	
Bank of N Y Trust	300	318
Bronx Trust	49/2	50%
Brown Trust	10	11
Brooklyn Trust	73	78
Central Hanover B & T	90	93
Chase National	29/2	31%
Chemical Bank & Trust	43/2	45%
Citron Trust	30	
Commercial National	10	12
Continental Trust	12	13%
Corporation Exchange Bk Tr.	47/2	48/2
Empire Trust Co (new)	42/2	45/2
First National	1630	1670
Fifth Avenue National	620	660
Fulton Trust	190	210
Guaranty Trust	276	281
Irving Trust	1492	1514
Jamaica Trust	27	30
Lawyers Trust	33/2	34
Manufacturers	334	354
Manufacturers cum pf	51	53
Merchants National	110	120
National Bronx	40	45
National City	20/2	22%
National Safety	98	101
Penn Exchange	91/2	101/2
Public National	29	30%
Sterling National	28	30
Title Guarantee	2%	3%
Trade	11	13
Underwriters Trust	80	90
United States Trust	1495	1545

Philadelphia:

Broad St Tr.	6	8
Central Penn National	29	32
Chestnut Hill Trust	12	15
City National	13	16
Corn Exchange	36/2	39%
Erie	25	30
Fidelity Philadelphia	210	225
Fidelity Co of Penn.	138	145
First National	303	288
Frankford	36	41
Germanstown	7	8%
Girard	51/2	54%
Industrial	2	3%
Kensington	23	26
Land Title	29	27
Liberty Title	30	
Market Street Natl	300	315
Mitten Trust	14	18
Nat Bank Germantown	44	47
Ninth Bank & Trust	2	3%
North Broad	3	4%
North Penn	60	71
North Philadelphia	78	83
Northern	500	520
Northeastern	11	14
Oiley	4	6
Pennsylvania Co	29	32
Philadelphia	90	103
Prudential	262	277
R. E. Olds	17	20
Roosevelt Trust	25	
Second	25	4%
Security Trust	41/2	6%
Tioga	4	6
Trademen's	110	115
Wyoming Trust	9	12

St. Louis:

Boatmen's National	32	34
First National	38	39
Industrial Bank & Tr.	95	100
Manufacturers Bk & Tr.	15	17
Mercantile Com Bk & Tr.	115	117
Mercantile Natl Bk cts.	34	4
Mischa Natl Ben cts.	27	29
Mischa Natl Ben cts.	27	29
Northwestern Natl Bk	20%	24%
St. Louis Union Trust	46	49%
Tower Grove Bank & Tr.	30	
United Bank & Tr.	70	75

San Francisco:

Bank of America N T S.	33%	35%
*Ex dividend.		

Public Utility Stocks

Key.	Bid	Offer
Alabama Power pf	994	1012</td

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